End Notes
[1] The Center for American Progress estimates that the Bush and Trump tax cuts combined will have added $10 trillion to the federal debt by the end of 2023, taking into account both the revenue lost and the associated debt service costs since their enactment. See Bobby Kogan, “Tax Cuts Are Primarily Responsible for the Increasing Debt Ratio,” Center for American Progress, March 27, 2023, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tax-cuts-are-primarily-responsible-for-the-increasing-debt-ratio/.
[2] TPC estimated that in 2010, the year the Bush tax cuts were fully phased in, they raised the after-tax incomes of the top 1 percent of households by 6.6 percent, compared to 2.6 percent for the middle 20 percent of households. The bottom 20 percent of households received the smallest cuts, with their after-tax incomes increasing by just 0.5 percent. TPC, “T10-0232 – Current Law; Baseline: Pre-EGTRRA Law; Distribution by Cash Income Percentile, 2010,” September 15, 2010, https://taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/numbers/content/PDF/T10-0232.pdf.
[3] 2025 is when the law is fully phased in and is before many provisions in the law are scheduled to expire. Tax Policy Center, “T17-0314 - Conference Agreement: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; Baseline: Current Law; Distribution of Federal Tax Changes by Expanded Cash Income Percentile, 2025,” December 18, 2017, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/conference-agreement-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-dec-2017/t17-0314-conference-agreement.
[4] Due to racial barriers to economic opportunity, households of color are overrepresented at the bottom of the income distribution while non-Hispanic white households are heavily overrepresented at the top. The 2017 tax law’s core provisions tilt heavily toward households at the top of the income distribution: white households in the highest-earning 1 percent receive 23.7 percent of the law’s total tax cuts, far more than the 13.8 percentage share that the bottom 60 percent of households of all races receive. Chye-Ching Huang and Roderick Taylor, “How the Federal Tax Code Can Better Advance Racial Equity,” CBPP, July 25, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/how-the-federal-tax-code-can-better-advance-racial-equity.
[5] Household income is expressed in 2017 dollars. Joint Committee on Taxation, “Tables Related to the Federal Tax System as in Effect 2017 through 2026,” JCX-32r-18, April 24, 2018, https://www.jct.gov/publications/2018/jcx-32r-18/.
[6] The law also added a $10,000 cap on the deduction for state and local taxes (SALT). This has an offsetting effect for some taxpayers when combined with the law’s changes to the alternative minimum tax (AMT). See Kimberly A. Clausing and Natasha Sarin, “The Coming Fiscal Cliff: A Blueprint for Tax Reform in 2025,” the Hamilton Project, September 2023, https://www.hamiltonproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230927_THP_SarinClausing_FullPaper_Tax.pdf.
[7] The law doubled the Child Tax Credit’s maximum value from $1,000 to $2,000 per child but denied millions of children in families with low and moderate incomes the full increase. In tax year 2022, roughly 19 million children get less than the full $2,000 Child Tax Credit or no credit at all because their families’ incomes are too low. Tax Policy Center, “T22-0123 – Distribution of Tax Units and Qualifying Children by Amount of Child Tax Credit (CTC), 2022,” October 18, 2022, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/children-and-other-dependents-receipt-child-tax-credit-and-other-dependent-tax. Further, the law was estimated in 2017 to have ended the Child Tax Credit for about 1 million children who weren’t eligible for a Social Security number because of their immigration status but might have been claimed as tax dependents using an Individual Tax Identification Number. CBPP, “2017 Tax Law’s Child Credit: A Token or Less-Than-Full Increase for 26 Million Kids in Working Families,” August 27, 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/2017-tax-laws-child-credit-a-token-or-less-than-full-increase-for-26-million.
[8] The 2017 law permanently switched from the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) to the “chained” CPI to adjust tax brackets and certain provisions for inflation each year. The chained CPI generally rises more slowly over time than traditional the CPI-U. This slower growth erodes the value of certain provisions, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, and is expected to push more taxpayers into higher tax brackets over time.
[9] TPC, “T22-0144 – Make the Individual Income Tax and Estate Tax Provisions in the 2017 Tax Act Permanent, by ECI Percentiles, 2026,” November 30, 2022, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/make-individual-income-tax-and-estate-tax-provisions-2017-tax-act-permanent-1.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] CBO, “The Distribution of Household Income, 2018,” August 4, 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57061.
[13] Ana Swanson, “Higher Prices, Trade Wars and More: What to Know About Trump’s Tariffs,” New York Times, November 7, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/07/business/economy/trump-tariffs-trade-what-to-know.html.
[14] Kimberly A. Clausing and Mary E. Lovely, “Why Trump’s Tariff Proposals Would Harm Working Americans,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2024, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/2024-05/pb24-1.pdf.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Council of Economic Advisers, “Corporate Tax Reform and Wages: Theory and Evidence,” October 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Tax%20Reform%20and%20Wages.pdf.
[17] Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. Marples, “The Economic Effects of the 2017 Tax Revision: Preliminary Observations,” Congressional Research Service, updated June 7, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45736.
[18] William Gale and Claire Haldeman, “The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Searching for supply-side effects,” Brookings Institution, July 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210628_TPC_GaleHaldeman_TCJASupplySideEffectsReport_FINAL.pdf.
[19] Patrick J. Kennedy et al., “The Efficiency-Equity Tradeoff of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” November 14, 2023, https://patrick-kennedy.github.io/files/TCJA_KDLM_2023.pdf. The $114,000 threshold for the 90th percentile of the within-firm earnings distribution appears in an earlier version of the paper, dated December 9, 2022 (Table 5, Panel A).
[20] Ibid. Some workers own stock and thus receive a share of the benefits going to firm owners, but even taking that into account, only 20 percent of the overall gains from the rate cut flow to the bottom 90 percent of workers. Workers with low or moderate incomes and wealth see very little of those already modest gains, because stock ownership is heavily concentrated at the top.
[21] Gabriel Chodorow-Reich et al., “Tax Policy and Investment in a Global Economy,” NBER Working Paper, March 2024, https://www.nber.org/papers/w32180. The authors show that even when corporate tax cuts increase economic activity, there are countervailing, dynamic revenue impacts. On the one hand, more economic activity could expand the tax base and therefore increase tax collections; on the other, increased investment leads firms to take more depreciation deductions, which decreases tax collections. This study concludes that these two forces nearly offset in the near term, such that “the total revenue effect closely mirrors the mechanical corporate effect.” In the long run, the paper projects that dynamic effects could “close roughly 20 percent of the mechanical revenue decline.” For claims that the 2017 tax law would pay for itself, see, e.g., Kate Davidson, “Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin: GOP Tax Plan Would More Than Offset Its Cost,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-secretary-steven-mnuchin-gop-tax-plan-would-more-than-offset-its-cost-1506626980.
[22] Jim Tankersley, “Trump’s Tax Cut Fueled Investment but Did Not Pay for Itself, Study Finds,” New York Times, March 4, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/04/us/politics/trump-corporate-tax-cut.html.
[23] For example, around 70 percent of the income of partnerships, a common pass-through structure, flows to the top 1 percent of households. Michael Cooper et al., “Business in the United States: Who Owns It, and How Much Tax Do They Pay?” Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2016, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/685594.
[24] CBO, “The Distribution of Household Income, 2021,” September 11, 2024, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60341.
[25] IRS Statistics of Income, “Individual Returns with Business Attributes: Selected Income Items, Adjustments, Credits, and Taxes, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2022,” https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-with-small-business-income-and-losses.
[26] Steven Mufson, “Sen. Johnson Is a ‘No’ on the Tax Bill. He Says it Hurts Businesses (Like His Own),” Washington Post, November 16, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sen-johnson-is-a-no-on-the-tax-bill-he-says-it-hurts-businesses-like-his-own/2017/11/16/c47b2a56-ca54-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e_story.html.
[27] Matthew J. Belvedere, “Mnuchin: GOP Tax Reform Would Give Small Business Owners the Lowest Rates ‘Since the 1930s,’” CNBC, November 17, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/17/mnuchin-gop-tax-plan-gives-small-business-lowest-rates-since-1930s.html.
[28] Lucas Goodman et al., “How Do Business Owners Respond to a Tax Cut? Examining the 199A Deduction for Pass-through Firms,” NBER Working Paper 28680, January 2024, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28680/w28680.pdf.
[29] Chuck Marr and Samantha Jacoby, “The Pass-Through Deduction Is Tilted Heavily to the Wealthy, Is Costly, and Should Expire as Scheduled,” CBPP, June 8, 2023, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/the-pass-through-deduction-is-tilted-heavily-to-the-wealthy-is-costly-and/.
[30] Jason DeBacker et al., “The Impact of State Taxes on Pass-Through Businesses: Evidence from the 2012 Kansas Income Tax Reform,” September 29, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958353. See also Michael Mazerov, “Kansas Provides Compelling Evidence of Failure of ‘Supply-Side’ Tax Cuts,” CBPP, January 22, 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/research/kansas-provides-compelling-evidence-of-failure-of-supply-side-tax-cuts.
[31] Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato, “Targeting business tax incentives to realize U.S. wage growth,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, January 14, 2021, https://equitablegrowth.org/targeting-business-tax-incentives-to-realize-u-s-wage-growth/.
[32] This figure is based on a compilation of CBO cost estimates that includes both the revenue and outlay effects of all major tax legislation enacted during the George W. Bush Administration. Based on analysis in Kathy Ruffing and Joel Friedman, “Economic Downturn and Legacy of Bush Policies Continue to Drive Large Deficits,” CBPP, updated February 28, 2013, https://www.cbpp.org/research/economic-downturn-and-legacy-of-bush-policies-continue-to-drive-large-deficits. For a detailed description of methodology used in this analysis, see box, “What Did Bush-Era Tax Cuts Cost through 2011?” in Kathy Ruffing and James R. Horney, “Downturn and Legacy of Bush Policies Drive Large Current Deficits,” CBPP, updated October 10, 2012, https://www.cbpp.org/research/downturn-and-legacy-of-bush-policies-drive-large-current-deficits.
[33] CBO, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028.”
[34] “Net debt” is the government’s total debt net of its financial assets, such as cash, gold, Treasury securities held by U.S. government agencies, and the value of student loans held by the government. Net debt is a better measure of the federal government’s financial position at any point in time than gross debt or debt held by the public because it includes all the financial assets and liabilities of the government. And because it does, it is the only measure of debt that equals the sum of annual deficits (and surpluses) while excluding financial transactions to the extent they do not affect deficits.
[35] The Bush tax cuts and their extensions included revenue losses caused by limiting the amount that the AMT would recapture from better-off tax filers. Because the AMT was not indexed for inflation in 2000, just before enactment of the Bush tax cuts, the AMT would have recaptured growing amounts of revenue as the years passed. As a result, legislation to limit the reach of the AMT became increasingly costly as the years passed, relative to 2000 AMT law. Those very costly effects were part of the Bush tax cuts and its extensions and so were part of all scores of that legislation by the Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation. In this analysis, however, smaller revenue losses are attributed to the AMT provisions of those tax cuts, measuring those revenue losses relative to a hypothetical AMT that had been indexed for inflation (rather than the actual, unindexed AMT), so estimates of the costs of the Bush tax cuts are more conservative.
[36] CBPP calculations based on CBO, “Budgetary Outcomes Under Alternative Assumptions About Spending and Revenues,” May 8, 2024, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60114.
[37] CBO, Budget and Economic Data, op. cit.; Chuck Marr and Samantha Jacoby, “Corporate Lobby’s New Math Doesn’t Add Up for Kids,” CBPP, December 8, 2022, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/corporate-lobbys-new-math-doesnt-add-up-for-kids; Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, “TCJA Extension Could Add $4 to $5 Trillion to Deficits,” June 13, 2024, https://www.crfb.org/blogs/tcja-extension-could-add-4-5-trillion-deficits. Provisions in 2017 law made some corporate tax provisions less generous over time. These include provisions affecting limits on interest deductibility, investment expensing, research and development expensing/amortization, and tax rates affecting low-taxed foreign income of U.S. multinational corporations and certain income from exports.
[38] CBPP analysis of CBO’s distribution of household income for households with children, at Congressional Budget Office, “The Distribution of Household Income in 2020,” November 14, 2023, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59509. We use CBO’s data through 2019 (2020, the latest year with available data, is distorted by COVID effects). Amounts are after taxes, exclude medical benefits, include other means-tested government transfers, and are adjusted for inflation to 2019 dollars. Incomes are ranked by post-tax, post-transfer incomes.
[39] Kalee Burns and Liana E. Fox, “The Impact of the 2021 Expanded Child Tax Credit on Child Poverty,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2022, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2022/demo/sehsd-wp2022-24.pdf.
[40] Andrew Barr, Jonathan Eggleston, and Alexander A. Smith, “Investing in Infants: the Lasting Effects of Cash Transfers to New Families,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 137, No. 4, April 20, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac023.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Martha Bailey et al., “Is the Social Safety Net a Long-Term Investment? Large-Scale Evidence from the Food Stamps Program,” Goldman School of Public Policy, April 2020, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/w26942.pdf; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, A Roadmap to Reducing Child Poverty, National Academies Press, 2019, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25246/a-roadmap-to-reducing-child-poverty. Greg Duncan, Pamela Morris, and Chris Rodrigues, “Does Money Really Matter? Estimating Impacts of Family Income on Young Children’s Achievement with Data from Random-Assignment Experiments,” Developmental Psychology, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2011; Chloe N. East, “The Effect of Food Stamps on Children’s Health: Evidence from Immigrants’ Changing Eligibility,” Journal of Human Resources, September 5, 2018; earlier version at http://www.chloeneast.com/uploads/8/9/9/7/8997263/east_jmp.pdf.
[43] George Fenton, “Bipartisan Child Tax Credit Expansion Would Benefit Millions of Workers in Low-Paid Occupations,” CBPP, February 20, 2024, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/bipartisan-child-tax-credit-expansion-would-benefit-millions-of-workers-in-low-paid.
[44] Kris Cox et al., “About 16 Million Children in Low-Income Families Would Gain in First Year of Bipartisan Child Tax Credit Expansion,” CBPP, January 22, 2024, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/about-16-million-children-in-low-income-families-would-gain-in-first-year-of.
[45] Kathleen Romig and Kathleen Bryant, “A National Paid Leave Program Would Help Workers, Families,” CBPP, April 27, 2021, https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/a-national-paid-leave-program-would-help-workers-families.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ember Energy, “Global Electricity Review 2024,” May 8, 2024, https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/global-electricity-review-2024/.
[48] “How Tax Credits are Driving Clean Energy Growth Two Years into Inflation Reduction Act,” U.S. Department of Energy, August 16, 2024, https://www.energy.gov/policy/articles/how-tax-credits-are-driving-clean-energy-growth-two-years-inflation-reduction-act; Trieu Mai et al., “Impacts of Federal Tax Credit Extensions on Renewable Deployment and Power Sector Emissions,” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2016, https://research-hub.nrel.gov/en/publications/impacts-of-federal-tax-credit-extensions-on-renewable-deployment-.
[49] Department of Energy, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces First Projects Receiving Clean Energy Manufacturing Investments in America’s Industrial and Energy Communities,” April 19, 2024, https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-first-projects-receiving-clean-energy-manufacturing.
[50] The White House, “Fact Sheet: Two Years In, the Inflation Reduction Act is Lowering Costs for Millions of Americans, Tackling the Climate Crisis, and Creating Jobs,” August 16, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/08/16/fact-sheet-two-years-in-the-inflation-reduction-act-is-lowering-costs-for-millions-of-americans-tackling-the-climate-crisis-and-creating-jobs/.
[51] Small-scale clean energy projects (i.e., those under 1 megawatt in size) are exempt from these requirements.
[52] E. Mark Curtis and Ioana Marinescu, “Green Energy Jobs in the US: What Are They, and Where Are They?” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, November 8, 2022, https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/green-energy-jobs-in-the-us-what-are-they-and-where-are-they/.
[53] The White House, op. cit.