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## DEFICIT PICTURE GRIMMER THAN CBO'S MARCH PROJECTIONS SUGGEST

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
### Summary

In March, the Congressional Budget Office issued new budget projections that show the federal government running a large cumulative deficit over the next ten years.<sup>1</sup> As CBO acknowledges, however, its baseline projection is unrealistically optimistic, since it does not include the costs of continuing various policies, such as the recent tax cuts.<sup>2</sup> Last month, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities joined with the Committee for Economic Development, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, and the Concord Coalition in reporting that omitted costs that are likely or virtually certain to be incurred equal about \$2.6 trillion over the next ten years. Adjusting the CBO baseline for such costs raises the deficit projection to \$4.6 trillion over the next ten years.

This analysis provides more of the detail behind these joint estimates (and, in so doing, serves as an update of the “Mid-Term and Long-Term Deficit Projections” jointly released by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Concord Coalition in September 2003). It also examines CBO data that shed light on the causes of the sharp fiscal deterioration of recent years. These data indicate that, among actions policymakers have taken, tax cut explain fully half of the shift from surpluses to deficits.

### Key Findings

- If the tax cuts are extended and other likely costs occur, deficits will total \$4.6 trillion over the next ten years, will never fall below \$300 billion in any year, and will exceed \$600 billion by 2014.
- Since January 2001, the budget outlook for the ten years 2002 to 2011 has deteriorated by \$8.8 trillion, with projections of surpluses being replaced by projections of large, sustained deficits.
- In terms of legislation since 2001, tax cuts are the single largest factor behind the move from surpluses to deficits.



<sup>1</sup> CBO, “An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2005,” March 2004.

<sup>2</sup> CBO, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005 to 2014,” January 26, 2004. In Table 1-3 of the January report, CBO provides estimates of the effects of policies that are not included in its official projections.

Key findings of this analysis include:

- The CBO ten-year projections understate the likely size of future deficits because they do not reflect the costs of continuing various policies currently in effect; for example, the CBO baseline assumes that all of the tax cuts enacted since 2001 will expire. The baseline also assumes that relief from the Alternative Minimum Tax will end, and the number of tax filers subject to the AMT will rise from about three million today to 30 million by 2010.
- CBO projects deficits totaling \$2.0 trillion over the ten-year period from 2005 through 2014. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Committee for Economic Development, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, and the Concord Coalition recently released joint estimates showing that a more realistic assessment — one that uses CBO estimates but incorporates likely or inevitable costs — puts the ten-year deficit at \$4.6 trillion.<sup>3,4</sup>

Under our assumptions, the national debt climbs from \$3.3 trillion at the end of 2001 to \$9.1 trillion by the end of 2014. National debt rises from 33 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 2001 to 51 percent of GDP by 2014.

- Under the more realistic assessment, the deficit exceeds \$300 billion in every year and stands at about \$417 billion in 2009, the year in which the President has said that the deficit would be cut in half. The \$417 billion figure is not substantially below the projected 2004 deficit, indicating little progress toward the goal of halving the deficit. Furthermore, by 2014, under these more realistic assumptions, the deficit reaches \$641 billion.
- The data show that the large deficits projected for the coming decade are more a reflection of a historically low level of revenues, measured as a share of the economy, than of an unusually high level of federal spending. In 2004, revenues will total 15.8 percent of GDP under current law, the *lowest level since 1950*.<sup>5</sup> Although revenues will rise as the economy recovers from the recession, they still

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<sup>3</sup> Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Committee for Economic Development, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, and Concord Coalition, “The Current Course: Deficits ‘As Far as the Eye Can See,’” April 20, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> In February, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued an earlier version of this report in which we projected a cumulative deficit of \$5.2 trillion for the 2005-2014 period. We currently project lower deficits, but the improvement is entirely explained by the fact that, unlike in February’s report, we now assume that the bonus depreciation tax cut — which was enacted in 2002 and enlarged in 2003 and is scheduled to expire after 2004 — will not be extended. The Administration did not propose extension of this provision in its FY 2005 Budget. Nonetheless, some policymakers continue to advocate extension, and the fate of bonus depreciation remains unclear. If this provision were extended, we would still project deficits of \$5.2 trillion for the ten-year period from 2005-2014.

<sup>5</sup> A recent CBO report suggests that, in 2004, revenues may exceed CBO’s March estimate by \$30 billion to \$40 billion. If so, 2004 revenues will be slightly less than 16.2 percent of GDP, the lowest level since 1951.

will average only 17.5 percent of GDP over the coming decade (2005 through 2014), assuming the recent tax cuts are extended and AMT relief is continued. That is below the average levels for the decades of the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's.

Federal spending, on the other hand, will average about 20.5 percent of GDP over the next 10 years, assuming enactment of the likely expenditures reflected in the more realistic ten-year deficit projection. This is *lower* than the level of federal spending in every year from 1980 through 1995.

### **Tax Cuts Are an Important Way Policymakers Have Increased Deficits**

In January 2001, CBO projections showed surpluses over the ten-year period from 2002 through 2011 totaling \$5 trillion. (This figure has been adjusted down from the official \$5.6 trillion CBO 2001 estimate to include likely or inevitable costs that were left out at that time, thereby making the 2001 projection comparable methodologically to our current projections; see box on page 7.) Our current estimate of this same ten-year period shows cumulative deficits of \$3.9 trillion, for a total deterioration of \$8.8 trillion over the ten-year period 2002 to 2011. (This \$3.9 trillion figure differs from the \$4.6 trillion cumulative deficit discussed in the first two pages, because the latter figure covers the years 2005-2014.)

What caused a projected surplus of \$5 trillion to become a projected deficit of \$3.9 trillion? Approximately 31 percent of this stunning \$8.8 trillion deterioration is due to the tax cuts enacted over the past three years or assumed in this analysis, making tax cuts slightly more important than spending increases in explaining the shift from surpluses to deficits. Another 30 percent of the deterioration is due to spending legislation, with more than two-thirds of the growth in spending representing increased costs for defense, homeland security, and the war on terrorism (and only one-twentieth of the new spending representing increased costs for domestic discretionary programs outside homeland security). The remainder of the deterioration (the other 39 percent of it) stems from the view CBO now holds that the economic and technical underpinnings of its 2001 projection were too rosy.

### **Continuing Large Deficits Harm The Economy**

The deficits we project — which will only grow larger when the baby boomers begin to retire at the end of the decade — pose a threat to the long-term health of the economy. Persistent large deficits tend to reduce national saving, crowd out private investment, and slow economic growth. In addition, former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and several economists recently warned that the projected long-term budget imbalances have become so large that they ultimately could lead to serious “financial and fiscal disarray” and cause a “fundamental shift in market expectations and a related loss of confidence at home and abroad.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Robert E. Rubin, Peter R. Orszag, and Allen Sinai, “Sustained Budget Deficits: Long-Run U.S. Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray,” Brookings Institution, January 4, 2004.

## CBO's 10-year Projections Do Not Reflect Several Trillion Dollars in Likely Costs

Under CBO's official baseline projection, large deficits in 2004 will be followed by falling deficits, bringing the budget nearly to balance by 2014. Over the ten-year period from 2005 through 2014, the sum of CBO's projected deficits is a cumulative deficit of \$2.0 trillion. CBO's projections imply steadily improving budgets after 2004.

But as is widely recognized, this projection is unrealistic. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities recently joined the Committee for Economic Development, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, and the Concord Coalition in releasing a joint analysis that concludes that the CBO baseline omits an estimated \$2.6 trillion in costs over the next ten years from legislation Congress and the President are likely — and in many cases, virtually certain — to enact.

- Enactment of the 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax cuts has filled the tax code with tax-reduction measures that are scheduled to expire between 2004 and 2010. If Congress makes the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent, as proposed by the Administration, Joint Committee on Taxation data indicates that the projected ten-year deficits will increase by \$1.3 trillion (including the added interest payments on the debt).
- The tax code also features a number of other temporary tax provisions (known as “extenders”) that have been routinely renewed in the past. Even though a number of these provisions were allowed to lapse at the end of last year, it is widely expected that they will be renewed, retroactive to the beginning of 2004. If they are made permanent (or continually extended), this would add an additional \$189 billion, including interest, to the deficits over the next ten years.
- In addition, while about three million tax filers are subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax in 2004, that figure is set to explode in coming years unless current AMT relief — which expires at the end of 2004 — is continued. Continuation of that relief — a near-certain event — would increase the ten-year deficit by another \$708 billion. This figure, which includes the associated interest costs, reflects CBO's estimate of the cost of extending AMT relief.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In its “Budget and Economic Outlook” from January, CBO breaks its estimate of the cost of extending AMT relief into several pieces. First, in Table 1-3, it shows \$376 billion as the ten-year cost of extending AMT relief. This figure, however, assumes that all other tax cuts expire as scheduled. Second, in a footnote to Table 1-3, CBO explains that this \$376 billion figure increases by \$173 billion if the tax cuts are extended rather than allowed to expire, which is the assumption used in this analysis. Next, CBO includes the additional debt-service cost of \$109 billion associated with these two pieces. When combined, these pieces total \$658 billion. In addition, one extender, not included in the previous bullet on the cost of maintaining the extenders, provides AMT relief by allowing certain personal tax credits to be used by those facing the AMT. Table 4-10 from CBO's January report (updated February 11<sup>th</sup>) shows that extending this provision would reduce revenues by \$42 billion over ten years — which would add an additional \$8 billion in interest costs. This brings the total cost of AMT relief to \$708 billion through 2014, including interest.

- On net, the CBO baseline also understates defense, homeland security, and international costs. On the one hand, the baseline overstates these costs by mechanically repeating in all future years last fall's \$87.5 billion supplemental appropriation bill that funded operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. This essentially assumes that the current operations and reconstruction effort in Iraq will occur every year for the next ten years. On the other hand, once corrected for this overstatement, the baseline funding levels fail to cover fully the costs of the Administration's Future-Year Defense Plan. CBO has estimated the costs of that plan in a separate report. Nor would the resulting baseline cover CBO's estimate of the cost of gradual diminution (but not elimination) of expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan or CBO's estimate of the cost of continuing other aspects of the war on terrorism. According to CBO's estimates, fully funding the Administration's Future-Year Defense Plan and the war on terrorism would add \$1.4 trillion in defense-related spending over the next ten years, including interest.<sup>8</sup> When both the overestimates and the underestimates in the CBO baseline are taken into account, the baseline understates likely defense, homeland security, and international costs by \$351 billion, including interest.

**Table 1**

<b>CBO Projections Do Not Include Likely Costs, 2005-2014</b>	
(In trillions of dollars)	
<b>CBO March Projections</b>	<b>\$2.0</b>
Extension of 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts	\$1.3
Extension of Tax "Extenders"	\$0.2
AMT Relief	\$0.7
Defense, International, and Homeland Security	\$0.4
Other Domestic Appropriations	\$0.0
<b>Resulting Deficit Projections</b>	<b>\$4.6</b>
<i>May not add due to rounding; figures include associated interest costs</i>	

CBO does not include any of these various costs in its projection because it follows mechanical rules that permit the inclusion only of tax and entitlement provisions that have already been enacted and of funding levels for discretionary (i.e., non-entitlement) programs — including defense, international, and homeland security programs — that equal current levels adjusted only for inflation. Adding the likely or inevitable tax and spending costs raises the projected deficits to \$4.6 trillion over the next ten years. (See Table 1, on page 3. For further details, see Appendix A.)

Other analysts have projected even larger deficits. For example, economists at both Brookings and Goldman Sachs estimate the deficits at \$5.5 trillion over the ten years from 2005-

<sup>8</sup> CBO, "The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2004," February 2004; Steven M. Kosiak, "Cost Growth in Defense Plans, Occupation of Iraq and War on Terrorism Could Add Nearly \$900 Billion to Projected Deficits" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 9, 2004; Steven M. Kosiak, unpublished estimates, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. In its report, CBO estimates the appropriations necessary to fully fund the future year defense plan and the war on terrorism. The Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) has converted CBO's estimate of the necessary funding (or "budget authority") to a slightly smaller estimate of the actual expenditures (or "outlays"). We adjust the CBO defense baseline to match these estimated expenditures, as calculated by CBO and CSBA.

2014.<sup>9</sup> The Brookings estimate is larger than the one presented here, primarily because it includes extension of bonus depreciation and a somewhat larger cost for AMT relief. The Goldman Sachs estimate assumes significantly higher defense and non-defense discretionary spending than this analysis. Given the President's recent budget — which did not include extension of bonus depreciation and which proposed cuts in domestic discretionary spending — we did not assume that bonus depreciation would be extended, and we assume that spending growth may be slower than projected by Goldman Sachs. The higher Brookings and Goldman Sachs estimates stand as warnings that the budget picture could be even grimmer than presented here.

This projection of \$4.6 trillion in cumulative deficits over the next ten years includes \$2.4 trillion in surpluses in the Social Security trust funds. Outside of Social Security, the projected ten-year deficits total \$7.0 trillion.

## How Did These Deficits Come About?

In January 2001, CBO's baseline projection showed surpluses totaling \$5.6 trillion over the ten-year period 2002-2011. Since that time, the budget world has turned on its head. Over the same ten-year period, deficits now are expected to total \$3.9 trillion.

From a \$5.6 trillion surplus to a \$3.9 trillion deficit is a swing of \$9.5 trillion. On a comparable basis, the deterioration is \$8.8 trillion, however, rather than \$9.5 trillion (see box on page 7). A deterioration of \$8.8 trillion in the budget outlook over a period of just more than three years is remarkable. Of this \$8.8 trillion drop, 39 percent is due to economic and technical reestimates. Tax cuts account for 31 percent of the \$8.8 trillion deterioration. Spending increases enacted by Congress and the President are responsible for the final 30 percent of the shift from surpluses to deficits.

**Economic and technical reestimates.** Economic and technical assumptions account for \$3.4 trillion of the fiscal deterioration since January 2001. The economic and technical assumptions that CBO employed in January 2001 have proven too optimistic. In January 2001, CBO did not foresee the recession that was a few months off. The recession and other economic factors are most significant in the short term, however; the larger, long-term problem is with CBO's "technical assumptions." In particular, CBO now believes that its January 2001 projections significantly overstated the level of tax revenues that the U.S. economy will generate. (The figures for the cost of CBO's economic and technical reestimates, like the figures for all components of the budget deterioration discussed here, include the associated increases in interest payments on the debt.)

**Tax legislation.** Tax cuts account for \$2.8 trillion of the \$8.8 trillion deterioration for the years 2002-2011, making them the most costly legislative change since 2001. Moreover, the

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<sup>9</sup> Peter Orszag and William G. Gale, "Budget Outlook: Updates and Implications," *Tax Notes*, February 16, 2004; William C. Dudley and Edward F. McKelvey, "The U.S. Budget Outlook: A Surplus of Deficits," Global Economics Paper No. 106, Goldman Sachs, March 31, 2004.

share of the fiscal deterioration that is attributable to tax cuts rises over time. By 2014, tax cuts will account for 36 percent of the deterioration.<sup>10</sup>

**Defense, homeland security, and international affairs.** Since 2001, new funding in the areas of defense, homeland security, and international affairs has accounted for more than two-thirds of all legislated spending increases. Of the \$8.8 trillion fiscal deterioration, \$1.8 trillion — or 21 percent — comes from increases in funding for these areas.<sup>11</sup>

**Prescription drugs and other entitlement legislation.** Enacted entitlement increases, including the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, account for \$664 billion — or 8 percent — of the \$8.8 trillion deterioration. The lion’s share of this amount is for the prescription drug benefit. The enacted entitlement increases also include the farm bill, the first airline bailout, compensation for victims of the terrorist attacks, two temporary provisions for extended unemployment benefits, temporary state fiscal relief, two bills increasing payments to Medicare providers, and legislation increasing benefits for certain categories of veterans.

**Domestic Appropriations other than Homeland Security.** A final \$127 billion — or just 1 percent — of the deterioration is due to increases in domestic “discretionary” programs other than homeland security. This amount is just one-fourteenth the size of the increase in costs for defense, homeland security, and international programs.

In recent months, some have put the primary blame for current federal deficits on “exploding” spending. The budget data contradict such claims. The

### Comparable Projections

In January 2001, CBO projected a \$5.6 trillion surplus over the ten-year period 2002-2011. To use that projection as a basis for comparison with the current projection, we need to make sure that both projections are made on a comparable basis. Since we have incorporated certain likely or inevitable costs into the current deficit projection, similar costs (such as the continuation of “tax extenders”) also must be incorporated into CBO’s January 2001 projection before the projections can be compared.

Doing so reduces the surpluses reflected in the January 2001 projection by about \$660 billion. After making these adjustments for comparability purposes, the difference between the surpluses projected in January 2001 for the 2002-2011 period and the deficits we now project for those years is \$8.8 trillion.

**Table 2**

#### The Projected \$8.8 Trillion Deterioration (2002-2011 totals in trillions of dollars)

Economic reestimates	\$0.7	8%
Technical reestimates	\$2.7	31%
Tax legislation	\$2.8	31%
Defense, homeland, & int.	\$1.8	21%
Rx drugs & other entitlement legislation	\$0.7	8%
<u>Domestic disc. other than homeland</u>	<u>\$0.1</u>	<u>1%</u>
<b>TOTAL changes</b>	<b>\$8.8</b>	<b>100%</b>

*May not add due to rounding; all figures include associated interest costs.*

<sup>10</sup> For more details on the cost, distribution, and economic effects of the tax cuts since 2001, see Isaac Shapiro and Joel Friedman, *Tax Returns: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Bush Administration Tax Cuts*, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 2004.

<sup>11</sup> In this analysis, we treat the costs of reconstruction in New York City after 9-11 as part of the category “defense, homeland security, and international.”

cost of the tax cuts is slightly greater than the cost of all spending legislation over the 2002-2011 period.

Furthermore, the economic and technical reestimates are almost entirely downward revisions in revenues.

Combining the tax cuts and the downward revisions in revenues, Table 3 shows that 79 percent of the \$8.8 trillion deterioration — or \$7.0 trillion of the total — reflects a decline in revenues plus the associated interest costs. Only \$1.9 trillion, or 21 percent, of the deterioration reflects an increase in spending. The drop in revenues has been nearly four times as important as the increase in federal spending in explaining the large shift from surpluses to deficits.

**Table 3**

<b>The Projected \$8.8 Trillion Deterioration</b> (2002-2011 totals in trillions of dollars)		
Revenues	\$7.0	79%
<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>\$1.9</u>	<u>21%</u>
TOTAL changes	\$8.8	100%
<i>May not add due to rounding; all figures include associated interest costs.</i>		

### Revenues At Historic Lows Over the Decade

This dramatic drop in federal revenues has left them at historic lows. Over the coming decade, revenues measured as a share of the economy will remain well below their modern average. Spending, on the other hand, will be near its recent historical norm as a share of the economy. This decade thus will feature large deficits stemming from unusually low revenue levels, coupled with spending levels that are normal in historical terms.

Table 4 compares the spending and revenue levels for the coming decade to the levels during the previous business cycle, 1989 through 2000. The 1989 – 2000 period covered both good times and bad; more significantly, those were years of greater fiscal discipline.

- Table 4 shows that the average level of revenues over the next ten years is expected to be 17.5 percent of GDP. This is 1.2 percent of GDP lower than the average for 1989 – 2000. As the

table also shows, this drop in revenues accounts for *all* of the difference between average deficits during the 1989 – 2000 period and the deficits now projected for the next ten years. The 17.5 percent average revenue level is low compared not only with levels in the 1989 – 2000 period but also with average revenue levels over the entire second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The average revenue level projected for the next ten years, measured as a share of the economy, is lower than the average revenue levels for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

- Revenues will remain at historically low levels even after a full economic recovery. In 2014, revenues are projected to reach 17.7 percent of GDP,

**Table 4**

<b>As a Share of GDP</b>			
	<u>89-00</u>	<u>05-14</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Revenues	18.7%	17.5%	-1.2%
<u>Spending</u>	<u>20.6%</u>	<u>20.5%</u>	<u>0.0%</u>
Deficits	-1.8%	-3.1%	-1.2%
<i>May not add due to rounding</i>			



assuming the tax cuts and AMT relief are extended. This still will be below the average revenue levels for all post-war decades except the 1950s.

- In contrast, despite the increases in spending for defense and certain other programs that are built into our more realistic projections, spending from 2005 through 2014 will average 20.5 percent of GDP. This is closely in line with the average level of spending from 1989 through 2000.
- Moreover, the average spending level that we project for the coming decade, measured as a share of the economy, is lower than the spending levels for every year from 1980 through 1995.


By the end of the current decade, the aging of the population and continued increases in health care costs will drive up spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, and total outlays will start a multi-decade rise to historic levels. If that increase in spending is coupled with the continuation of historically low revenues, as is projected, the nation will face even larger, more threatening deficits. This upsurge in spending is still some years away, however, and the story of the current decade's deficits — and of the dramatic turnabout of the past three years — is more about falling revenues than rising spending.

### Implications for the Nation's Economic Health: Rising Debt and Slower Growth

By the end of the decade, the first of the baby-boomers will have reached retirement age. Deficits are projected to rise substantially in the decades that follow. The costs of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will grow faster than the economy and the nation's revenue base. By running large deficits in the years *before* the baby boomers retire, the country is squandering the opportunity to prepare for this major demographic change.

If the debt were to *decrease* substantially during the coming decade — as it was on course to do only a few years ago — the federal government could avoid hundreds of billions of dollars a year in interest payments *every year* in the future. Had we continued to adhere to policies to shrink the debt over this decade, we would largely have eliminated the cost of one of the biggest and most wasteful of federal programs — interest payments on the debt.

Three years ago, net interest payments on the debt were projected to disappear before the end of the decade as the debt shrank to zero. Now, under our projections, the debt will reach \$9.1 trillion in 2014, or almost 51 percent of GDP. This is a major increase from 2001, when debt was 33 percent of GDP. As a result, interest payments on the debt are projected to rise significantly.



For instance, in January 2001, interest payments were projected to be \$730 billion over the 2002 to 2011 period; today, we estimate that interest payments will total \$2.5 trillion for that same ten-year period, a more than three-fold increase. Over the ten years from 2005 to 2014, interest payments are estimated to total \$3.3 trillion. By 2014, interest payments are projected to consume \$457 billion a year and eat up 12 percent of the federal budget.

The projected deficits also pose risks to the nation's long-term economic health. Higher deficits reduce national saving and thereby result in less domestic investment (and more borrowing from overseas). Expectations of persistently high future deficits also can raise long-term interest rates. Such outcomes lower the nation's future income and standard of living.

The large long-term deficits that the United States now faces are stirring concern internationally. A recent International Monetary Fund report scolded U.S. policymakers in terms usually reserved for third-world countries with unstable fiscal policies. As the *New York Times* reported, ". . . the [IMF] report sounded a loud alarm about the shaky fiscal foundations of the United States, questioning the wisdom of the Bush administration's tax cuts and warning that large budget deficits pose 'significant risks' not just for the United States but for the rest of the world."<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, a recent analysis by former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Brookings Institution economist Peter Orszag, and Wall Street economist Allen Sinai warns that "the scale of the nation's projected budgetary imbalances is now so large that the risk of severe adverse consequences must be taken very seriously, although it is impossible to predict when such consequences may occur." Rubin and his colleagues warn that the budget deficits we will face if we remain on our current policy course, by making the tax cuts permanent and continuing other spending and tax policies, could lead to "financial and fiscal disarray" and cause a "fundamental shift in market expectations and a related loss of confidence at home and abroad." While it is impossible to know at what point this change in market expectations might take place, Rubin and his colleagues observe that once it occurs, it would "magnify the costs associated with any given underlying budget deficit and depress economic activity much more than the conventional analysis would suggest."<sup>13</sup>

## Conclusion

CBO now projects cumulative deficits of \$2.0 trillion over the next ten years. But as CBO notes, this projection is based on a mechanical formula that leaves out various likely costs. Adjusting for the extension of the tax cuts as proposed in the President's budget, continuation of AMT relief, and full funding of the Administration's defense plan, among other costs, brings the ten-year cumulative deficit to \$4.6 trillion.

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<sup>12</sup> Elizabeth Becker and Edmund L. Andrews, "IMF Warns That U.S. Debt Is Threatening Global Stability," *The New York Times*, January 8, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Rubin, et. al., *op. cit.*

This represents a fiscal sea change from three years ago. In 2001, surpluses were projected through the end of the decade, and the federal debt was expected to disappear. Now, unsustainably large deficits loom as far as the eye can see.

In terms of legislation enacted since January 2001, tax cuts explain slightly over half of the move from surpluses to deficits. This year, revenues are expected to represent about 16 percent of GDP, the lowest level since the 1950's. Even after the economy recovers, revenues will be lower, as a percentage of the economy, than the average revenue levels for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s.

When the baby-boomers begin to retire at the end of the decade, the federal government will start to face even more difficult fiscal times. Spending will begin a rise to historically high levels as the aging of the population and continued increases in health care costs drive up costs for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. In short, if we remain on our current policy course, revenues will remain at unusually low levels while expenditures grow to historically high levels. The large imbalance between revenues and spending that lies ahead threatens to produce dangerously large deficits.

The story of the *current* decade's deficits and of the dramatic turnabout of the past three years, however, is more about falling revenues rather than rising spending. By running large deficits over this decade, federal policymakers are missing their last, best opportunity to help prepare for the baby boomers' retirement and to place the nation on firmer fiscal and economic footing for the long term.

## **Appendix A**

### **The CBO Baseline and What It Does Not Include**

CBO's official baseline estimates are a projection of future expenditures and revenues, calculated according to a rigid set of rules under which the baseline reflects current law as it is scheduled to apply in future years. CBO's official projections thus assume, for example, that all of the tax cuts scheduled to expire will terminate on schedule.

These projections are the basic benchmark against which analysts routinely assess the costs of proposed and actual changes in law. These projections do not necessarily provide a realistic assessment, however, of the future fiscal outlook, and are not intended to do so. Because of the rules on which they are based, the CBO projections present a much rosier picture of the future than is likely to occur.

In the past, when the significance of scheduled expirations of tax cuts was trivial, the budget baseline functioned *both* as a benchmark against which to measure the cost of legislation *and* as a plausible predictor of future deficits. It no longer does the latter. As former CBO Director (and current Urban Institute President) Robert Reischauer has remarked, "Rarely have the policies underlying the baseline projections been as disconnected from the policy makers' agendas as they are today."<sup>14</sup>

The official CBO projections are unrealistically rosy for two essential reasons. First, they omit the costs of extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts beyond their scheduled expiration dates, providing relief from the mushrooming alternative minimum tax, and extending various tax breaks that are scheduled to expire but that Congress always renews. Second, they understate costs for appropriated programs, especially in the areas of defense, homeland security, and the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. The CBO projection does overstate certain costs for appropriated programs due to the assumed repetition of the \$87.5 billion Iraq supplemental appropriation each year, but this overstatement is outweighed by understatements in other projected defense and anti-terrorism costs.

### **Likely or Inevitable Costs Not Reflected in the CBO Baseline**

In April, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities joined with the Committee for Economic Development, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, and the Concord Coalition in releasing joint projections of deficits over the next ten years. This section further explains the adjustments made to the CBO baseline in arriving at the joint estimates. It also examines data that shed light on the causes of the sharp fiscal deterioration of recent years. These data indicate that among actions policymakers have taken, tax cuts explain slightly more than half of the shift from surpluses to deficits.

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<sup>14</sup> Robert D. Reischauer, president of the Urban Institute and former Director of CBO, "Framing the Budget Debate for the Future," testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, January 29, 2002.

Table A-1

Adjustments to CBO Deficit Projections (in billions of dollars)											
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
<b>CBO March 2004 projections</b>	<b>-363</b>	<b>-273</b>	<b>-274</b>	<b>-286</b>	<b>-281</b>	<b>-272</b>	<b>-176</b>	<b>-38</b>	<b>-34</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-2,012</b>
Extension of 2001 and 2003 tax cuts	-13	-31	-34	-33	-41	-38	-179	-289	-316	-346	-1,321
Extension of tax “extenders”	-5	-7	-10	-15	-18	-21	-24	-27	-30	-33	-189
AMT relief	-10	-27	-36	-46	-59	-73	-88	-103	-122	-145	-708
Defense, homeland security, international	3	-9	-10	-16	-19	-39	-52	-57	-74	-79	-351
Domestic discretionary	6	8	7	4	1	-3	-7	-12	-17	-23	-37
<b>Resulting deficit projections</b>	<b>-381</b>	<b>-340</b>	<b>-358</b>	<b>-392</b>	<b>-417</b>	<b>-446</b>	<b>-526</b>	<b>-526</b>	<b>-592</b>	<b>-641</b>	<b>-4,618</b>
Resulting deficit projections as a percent of GDP	-3.2%	-2.7%	-2.7%	-2.8%	-2.9%	-2.9%	-3.3%	-3.2%	-3.4%	-3.5%	-3.1%
<i>Notes: Negative values indicate deficits or costs that increase deficits. Positive values reflect surpluses or policies that reduce deficits. All figures include both the policy’s direct costs and the additional interest costs it generates.</i>											

**Extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts:** CBO’s projections assume the entire 2001 tax cut will expire on schedule in 2010. Few observers believe this will occur. Indeed, the President’s budget proposes making the tax cuts permanent. The President’s budget would only allow three major provisions from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts to expire. They are bonus depreciation, which permits corporations to write-off more quickly the depreciation of their investments; an above the line deduction for certain higher education expenses; and the saver’s credit, which encourages saving among low and middle income households. This analysis assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent, as proposed by the President.

By official estimates, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are projected to cost \$1.35 trillion and \$330 billion, respectively — for a grand total of \$1.68 trillion cumulated over time. (The 2003 tax cut also included \$20 billion of fiscal assistance to the states, bringing its total official cost to \$350 billion.) The cost of the tax cuts was held to \$1.68 trillion, however, only because the entire 2001 tax package was set to expire after 2010 and because eight of the nine tax-cutting provisions in the 2003 bill were written so those provisions would expire in 2004, 2005, or 2008. If these “artificial sunset dates” are removed as proposed by the President — a likely occurrence given that the Congressional Leadership also seems intent on extending these provisions — the cost of the 2001 and 2003 tax-cuts legislation, not including interest, would exceed \$2.8 trillion through 2014.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> If bonus depreciation — one of three provisions from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts not extended in the President’s budget — were also made permanent, the total cost of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would rise to \$3.3 trillion over the ten-year period, not including interest.

Table A-2

Differences Between the 2001 CBO Projections (Adjusted for Comparability) and Our Current Projections for 2002-2011 (in billions of dollars)												2002- 2011 Totals
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
<b>CBO's 2001 surplus projection (adjusted for comparability)</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>547</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>668</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>4,952</b>
Economic reestimates	-27	-120	-124	-76	-45	-35	-47	-58	-62	-70	-86	-723
Technical reestimates	-42	-201	-246	-276	-271	-266	-269	-278	-299	-309	-308	-2,722
Tax cuts, incl. extensions and AMT relief	-75	-84	-195	-297	-249	-235	-262	-292	-325	-360	-460	-2,761
Defense, homeland security, & international	-5	-49	-104	-148	-163	-187	-196	-212	-225	-256	-285	-1,826
Domestic appropriations except homeland security	3	2	-11	-17	-15	-11	-13	-14	-15	-18	-16	-127
Rx drug benefits and other entitlements	-8	-15	-45	-45	-38	-59	-75	-85	-93	-100	-109	-664
<b>Subtotal: changes from 2001 projection</b>	<b>-154</b>	<b>-467</b>	<b>-725</b>	<b>-858</b>	<b>-782</b>	<b>-793</b>	<b>-862</b>	<b>-940</b>	<b>-1,020</b>	<b>-1,114</b>	<b>-1,263</b>	<b>-8,823</b>
<b>Resulting deficits</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>-158</b>	<b>-375</b>	<b>-479</b>	<b>-381</b>	<b>-340</b>	<b>-358</b>	<b>-392</b>	<b>-417</b>	<b>-446</b>	<b>-526</b>	<b>-3,871</b>

*Notes: A negative value indicates a deficit or a cost that increases deficits. Positive values reflect policies which create a surplus. All figures include both the policy's direct costs and the additional interest costs it generates.*

Combining the costs of extending the 2001 tax-cut law after 2010 and the removal of the artificial sunsets in the 2003 tax-cut law results in a total of \$1.2 trillion in costs, not including interest, that are not reflected in the CBO baseline. When the added interest costs are included, the extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts as proposed by the President would add \$1.3 trillion to CBO's 10-year deficit projection, as Table A-1 indicates.

**Extending the Tax "Extenders":** The tax code also features a number of other temporary tax provisions (known as "extenders") that have been routinely renewed in the past. For example, these provisions include the research and experimentation tax credit and welfare-to-work tax credit. Even though a number of these provisions were allowed to lapse at the end of last year, it is widely expected that they will be renewed, retroactive to the beginning of 2004. If they are made permanent (or continually extended), this would add an additional \$189 billion, including interest, to the deficits over the next ten years.

**The Alternative Minimum Tax:** The provisions of current law that prevent the Alternative Minimum Tax from affecting large numbers of middle-class taxpayers are scheduled to have expired by the end of 2004. There is little question such relief will be extended. Without it, the number of taxpayers subject to the AMT will explode from about 3 million today to 40 million by 2014, assuming the 2001 tax cut is extended past its 2010 expiration date. Observers consider continuation of AMT relief a virtual certainty, and the Administration has said it plans to address the AMT issue in 2005. CBO estimates that the cost of extending current relief by making permanent the temporary increase in the AMT exemption, indexing the AMT exemption and tax brackets to inflation, and continuing the allowance of certain personal credits against the

AMT equals \$708 billion through 2014, including interest costs.<sup>16</sup> (See Appendix B for further discussion of the AMT issue.)

**Defense, Homeland Security, and International Affairs:** CBO's baseline projections assume discretionary (or non-entitlement) programs will continue to be funded at 2004 levels, adjusted only to cover inflation. As a result, the baseline projections overstate national security costs in some respects and understate them in others.

We produce a more plausible projection of costs in this area by making several adjustments. We begin by adjusting the baseline downward by removing from CBO's January baseline the mechanical annual repetition of last fall's \$87.5 billion supplemental appropriation for defense and international affairs. By repeating the supplemental every year, the CBO baseline essentially assumes that the occupation of Iraq will continue each year for the next ten years, which produces an overstatement of costs.

But the resulting baseline, after removal of this supplemental, is too low for several reasons. First, the baseline does not reflect the full cost of the increases that the Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes in homeland security, the structure of the armed forces, and the military hardware that the armed forces use. We add to the resulting baseline the amount needed to bring the defense and homeland security paths up to the levels in the President's budget.

Second, CBO has found that the President's budget itself does not reflect the full costs of the Administration's multi-year defense plan for weapons and procurement and operations and support. The Pentagon periodically publishes a "Future-Year Defense Plan," which essentially serves as the Administration's multi-year defense blueprint. A recent CBO report makes clear, however, that the Administration's budget underestimates the costs of this plan. In that report, CBO estimates the amount of the shortfall, and the Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has converted CBO's estimate of the shortfall in funding (or "budget authority") to a slightly smaller estimate of the shortfall in actual expenditures (or "outlays"). This shortfall is incorporated into the baseline here to reflect likely defense costs.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, neither the Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget nor the \$87.5 billion supplemental appropriation bill included costs for the global war on terrorism — or operations in Iraq and Afghanistan — after September 30, 2004. CBO assumes the war on terrorism will continue indefinitely but that the large expenditures for Iraq and Afghanistan will ramp down over five years. This assumption is part of the just-mentioned CBO analysis.

By backing out the repetition of the October 2003 supplemental and adding these likely defense and anti-terrorism costs, we find that the CBO baseline understates likely defense, homeland security, and international affairs expenditures by \$303 billion. With interest, this adds \$351 billion to the projected deficits.

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<sup>16</sup> See footnote 7.

<sup>17</sup> CBO, *The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2004*, February 2004; Steven M. Kosiak, "Cost Growth in Defense Plans, Occupation of Iraq and War on Terrorism Could Add Nearly \$900 Billion to Projected Deficits" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 9, 2004.

**Domestic Appropriations:** CBO projects that discretionary funding will grow by enough to keep pace with inflation. For 2005, this is likely to overstate domestic discretionary spending outside homeland security and to understate homeland security expenditures. In its budget for 2005, the Administration holds domestic discretionary appropriations outside homeland security to 0.5 percent nominal growth. Although this would mean cuts in real terms in domestic discretionary programs outside homeland security, Congress might adhere to the President's plan.<sup>18</sup>

In 10 of the last 15 years, however, funding for domestic appropriations has grown faster than inflation plus population growth. Although appropriations might slow in the current budget cycle, it seems likely this historical funding pattern will reassert itself over the course of the decade.

Accordingly, we assume that in 2005 domestic appropriations, outside homeland security, will grow at a 0.5 percent nominal rate. For years after 2005, we assume that domestic discretionary appropriations outside homeland security will rise with inflation and population growth. This results in projected expenditures for domestic discretionary programs being approximately \$37 billion greater over ten years than CBO's baseline assumes, including interest costs.

In summary, the list of items not included in CBO's baseline is both lengthy and costly. With interest, it reaches \$2.6 trillion over the decade and raises deficits to \$4.6 trillion.

It is possible that some fraction of this \$2.6 trillion in added costs might be avoided. But these estimates also may turn out to be conservative and to *underestimate* costs. Our projection assumes that the bonus depreciation tax cut is not extended and that there are no additional tax cuts whatsoever over the next ten years. The Administration and the Congressional Leadership favor additional tax cuts, and both houses of Congress have already passed a number of additional tax-cut measures (although some of these measures have passed one chamber but not the other and other measures have passed both houses but in somewhat different forms).

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<sup>18</sup> The conference report on the fiscal year 2005 congressional budget resolution, recently passed by the House, sets 2005 appropriations for domestic discretionary programs outside homeland security very close to the level proposed in the President's budget. Although the budget resolution conference report has been held up in the Senate due to disagreement over the procedural treatment of future tax cuts, Congress currently intends to adhere fairly closely to the President's overall appropriations request and to hold the nominal growth in domestic discretionary appropriations to under 1 percent for fiscal year 2005.



## Appendix B

### AMT Relief

The tax-cut legislation enacted in May 2003 includes a provision to protect taxpayers from the swelling Alternative Minimum Tax, but only through 2004. The Administration has requested extension of AMT relief in its budget, but only through 2005.

The *New York Times* has quoted Pamela Olson, who, at the time, was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, as stating that the Administration plans to propose a long-term solution to the AMT in the first year of President Bush's second term. The article reported, "The target date [for a longer-term AMT proposal] is 2005, she said. 'We are working on it,' Ms. Olson said."<sup>19</sup> Addressing the AMT problem is clearly part of Administration and congressional plans. The costs of doing so beyond 2004, however, are not included in the CBO budget projections.

### Source of the AMT Problem

The Alternative Minimum Tax is a parallel tax system originally designed to ensure that tax filers with high incomes do not avoid paying taxes through aggressive use of tax shelters and other measures. Affected taxpayers calculate their tax liability under both the regular income tax and the AMT and pay whichever amount is larger.

Unlike the regular income tax code, however, the key components of the AMT are not indexed for inflation. As a result, as incomes rise over time with inflation, more taxpayers become subject to the AMT. This problem was exacerbated by the 2001 tax-cut legislation, which reduced tax liabilities under the regular income tax code, particularly for people with high incomes, without making corresponding adjustments in the AMT.

About three million taxpayers currently are subject to the AMT. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the number of taxpayers subject to the AMT will soar to 40 million by 2014, assuming the 2001 tax cuts are made permanent. Treasury estimates corroborate this finding.

By 2014, the AMT will be affecting one of every three taxpayers in the nation, with many middle-class families becoming subject to it and its complexities. By that time, the AMT will be "taking back" a goodly share of the 2001 tax cut from many of these families. In fact, the Treasury Department estimates that, by 2013, it would cost less to repeal the regular individual income tax (keeping only the AMT) than to repeal the AMT (keeping only the regular income tax), assuming the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are extended.<sup>20</sup> It is inconceivable that the President or either party in Congress will allow the AMT to mushroom in this manner.

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<sup>19</sup> David Cay Johnston, "Alternative Tax Looms Large Despite Plans for Other Cuts," *The New York Times*, January 10, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Department of the Treasury, "Fact Sheet, The Toll of Two Taxes: The Regular Individual Income Tax and the AMT," April 2, 2004.

## The High Cost of AMT Relief

Preventing the individual Alternative Minimum Tax from exploding in size and encroaching heavily upon middle-class taxpayers in the years to come is likely to be costly. Because current law provides AMT relief only through 2004, however, the cost of AMT relief is missing from CBO's budget baseline.

In addition, the omission of AMT relief causes the proposal to make the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent appear to carry a much lower cost than the proposal actually entails. Official estimates of the cost of making the tax cut permanent rest upon the highly unrealistic assumption that AMT relief will end after 2004, the number of taxpayers subject to the AMT will mushroom, and the swollen AMT will cancel out a sizeable share of the tax cuts and make the cost of permanently extending the tax cuts much smaller than it otherwise would be. This device — proposing to make the tax cuts permanent while deferring a proposal to continue AMT relief — enables the Administration to present the cost of making the tax cut permanent as being much lower than it really is.

There is little question that AMT relief will be continued beyond 2004. As noted, the Bush Administration itself intends to propose such relief, and the House of Representatives recently approved legislation that would extend AMT relief for one year.<sup>21</sup> The cost of extending AMT relief beyond 2004 is essentially an "off-book liability" that must be considered a part of the long-term cost of any proposal to make the 2001 tax cut permanent.

### Revenue-Neutral AMT Relief?

It is possible to prevent most middle class filers from falling under the AMT without incurring significant costs. The Tax Policy Center has designed an option to restructure the AMT in a cost-neutral manner; this option would free large numbers of middle-class taxpayers from the AMT and offset that cost by making the AMT tougher on high-income taxpayers who employ multiple tax breaks — especially taxpayers at very high income levels, who currently are barely touched by the AMT. Such a proposal is likely to encounter strong opposition, however, from the Administration and the Congressional leadership, and is not considered politically realistic in the current environment.

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<sup>21</sup> The temporary AMT relief contained in the 2003 tax-cut legislation expands a similar provision included in the 2001 tax-cut law, which itself provided AMT relief only through 2004. The 2001 tax-cut law provided AMT relief only through 2004 because the cost of providing permanent AMT relief would have driven the cost of that legislation well beyond what the fiscal year 2002 Congressional budget resolution allowed, unless some of the other tax cuts in the 2001 legislation were pared back. The framers of the 2001 tax cut resorted to the gimmick of letting AMT relief sunset at the end of 2004, knowing that Congress would have no choice but to extend AMT relief before it expired. This same scenario occurred in the 2003 tax-cut legislation; AMT relief in 2004 was increased so that accelerating the reduction in income tax rates into 2003 would not cause millions more filers to become subject to the AMT immediately. Once again, relief was provided only through 2004, because relief *after* 2004 could not be squeezed into the Senate's \$350 billion target for the tax-cut package without scaling back other tax cuts in the legislation.