

AMERICA'S FISCAL CHOICES

STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMY
& BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

Panel 2: Economists Panel: Budget Policy, Short-Term Recovery and Long-Term Growth

9:30 am – 10:30 am

Moderated by:
Jackie Calmes, *New York Times*

Panelists:
Jan Hatzius, Goldman Sachs
Paul Krugman, *New York Times*
Martin Feldstein, Harvard

[*] (UNKNOWN): A couple of housekeeping notes, there's Internet Wi- Fi access available in this room, on the back of your name tags you have the log in information for that.

Also, for those following through the social media, our official Twitter hash tag is fiscal choices, and as it's been pointed out, we're not going to do any more PowerPoints for the remainder of the day, we're going to have discussions that, I think, are likely to be very illuminating.

And we're very fortunate, as well, to have journalists moderating those discussions, who, in their own right are sophisticated policy analysts.

So I think we're going to have a very fascinating day, and certainly kicking off this first discussion on budget policy, short- term recovery, and economic growth, I think we're all very eager to hear what everybody says.

So, Jackie Combs (ph), welcome, of New York Times, and thank you so much for doing this for us.

(APPLAUSE)

CALMES: Now, we all can be heard -- you can hear me fine everywhere? OK, I'll assume so.

I read something in the paper this morning attributed to Michael Kinsley, that I thought was sort of appropriate to make me appreciate being on this panel today. It said -- he said intellectual dishonesty is so built into the Washington culture that you have to force yourself to notice it.

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So here, as I'm in the final month of covering politics and policy before a very high stakes mid-term election, I can talk to people who actually know this thing factually, as opposed to ideologically, or any other way.

So, I thought I'd just start off, not take up any time with what I have to say, and just ask each of our panelists what they see as the trajectory for unemployment through the end of 2011, and when we might start to see something approximating full employment, and what do we need to do to get there.

So, with that small little question, I'm going to start with Paul.

KRUGMAN: OK.

So on the first half of that question, I only know what Jan tells me, basically. But, no, it's pretty clear that we're looking for, unless something very surprising happens, we're looking for rising unemployment over at least the next few months, slowing economy, it doesn't look good.

And 2011, certainly nothing very good is going to happen, unless, again, there's some really startling event. And I would have guessed that we probably see unemployment continuing to rise, right up to the end, but maybe there's something more that comes on. It's certainly a really lousy outlook for the next year.

And as for when we return to something that looks like full employment, I think the maximum likelihood estimate is, basically, never. I mean, that can't be right. I mean, something happens, in the long run, aside from being dead, something. But there's nothing visible on the horizon that will cause that to happen. There's just nothing out there. There's no policy in the offing that seems to be aiming at returning to full employment, there's no technology that will drive a large amount of business investment.

Historically, the aftermath (inaudible) financial crises, countries recover by having a huge exchange rate depreciation, which then leads to an export boom, but since it's basically the whole advanced world that's caught up in this, and there aren't any other planets to export to, that's not going to happen. So this thing can go on for, basically, indefinitely. For end years, where end may well be a double digit number.

CALMES: So what do you do to improve the picture?

KRUGMAN: OK. So the last time we had a global financial crisis, the recovery to full employment was accomplished by a coordinated, large fiscal expansion, known as World War II. I mean, the best -- I mean, we ought to be doing everything you can. We ought to be having quantitative easing, we ought to be having another round of stimulus.

Really, as best I can guess at what might work, you'd have to have a combination of monetary fiscal stimulus big enough to bring the past utilization back up to a high enough level that business investment really starts going again. And at that point, you know, we often use these metaphors which are pretty bad about jump starting recover, or

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pump priming, which, since nobody knows what that means anymore, don't work so well.

And -- but, I mean, essentially you have to make a try at jump starting. You have to do a big enough program so that it really does become self-sustaining, which, I think, is, means a big enough program that it gets business investment going.

And, you know, will (inaudible) will President Palin and Treasury Secretary Ron Paul be willing to go for that, and the answer is probably not.

(LAUGHTER)

CALMES: Marty? FELDSTEIN: I don't think Paul and I disagree all that much about the outlook. Certainly about the short term, frankly. (inaudible) it's pretty bleak. We have a GDP gap now, which is roughly a trillion dollars, that's why we have almost 10 percent unemployment, and the GDP gap was almost as large at the beginning of 2009, and the fiscal stimulus package wasn't close to big enough to fill that hole.

It was an \$800 billion, roughly, package, but not in a single year. So you had a whole which was, roughly, \$800 billion dollars and they tried to fill it with a \$300 billion, \$400 billion annual fiscal injection, and that left a very big hole. And so we never got lift off, we never got into a recovery. And various temporary measures that we had, the cash for clunkers, the first-time homebuyers, they're finished.

And so, having failed to get into a sustainable recovery, the danger is that we will actually churn down again, we're so close to zero growth when you take out inventory accumulation that any serious adverse shock could hurt.

The rest of the world is not going to help. The dollar relative to the rest of the world is not going to help.

(AUDIO GAP)

KRUGMAN: But how sure are we of that if this happens, say, next year? I mean, we're -- we are almost certainly heading for, you know, regardless of whether the Democrats somehow cling to the House, we're almost certainly heading for political paralysis. I mean (inaudible) even odds on a government...

CALMES: Even more political paralysis.

KRUGMAN: Even more political (inaudible). I was about to say, I'd put a 50 percent probability on a government shutdown sometime in the next two years, 1995 but worse. We'll be looking back to the wise statesmanship of Newt Gingrich.

And in that -- and given the -- in that kind of environment, it's kind of hard to see a TARP II. It's really hard to imagine that in fact we will have the political consensus to do this.

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So there is -- I'd say that -- I'd add, I think -- I agree with Jan that there's -- there are two main scenarios, one of which is pretty bad and one of which is very bad. But there's probably a third one, which is absolutely catastrophic, and that's not negligible now.

Sorry. We can all...

CALMES: Let me get...

KRUGMAN: Let's all end it here.

FELDSTEIN: So what can be done? So one thing that can be done is to work on fixing the situation for owner-occupied housing, fixing the mortgage situation. None of these are guaranteed to fill a trillion dollar hole, but they move you in the right direction. If house prices are beginning to go up, consumers are going to have more confidence. They're going to spend more.

One of the things that's been a drag on the economy, is that, while consumer spending has been rising along with GDP, it's been rising more slowly, meaning the saving rate has been going up.

My crystal ball isn't good enough to know whether it's going to keep going up, but it certainly could. That would be a drag. But if house prices are turning around, that's going to help a lot. So I would say that's one thing that can be done.

Another thing that can be done is to deal with the problem that was just mentioned and that is the commercial real estate. Not the biggest, best buildings, but all of the small town shopping malls, office buildings, factories that are -- that went through the same kind of price boom and decline that residential housing did.

You don't hear so much about it, but, again, commercial real estate prices are off from the peak by about 40 percent. A lot of that is financed on five-year balloon loans that will start to come due 2011, 2012.

The significance of all that is that lending is highly concentrated in the small banks. The local and regional banks, the thousands of banks around the country that small business depend on.

So if we don't fix that problem, those banks are not going to lend, because they are afraid of what's going to happen to their capital as these losses begin to occur. And that's why they're holding back on lending to small businesses, and that's one of the things that makes it hard for small businesses to hire and expand.

So, again, I think that's something that could be dealt with. One could go in and work on the capital effects of fixing the impaired loans, impaired commercial real estate loans on the books of these thousands of small banks that we have around the country.

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CALMES: What is the government's role in doing that, though, I mean...

FELDSTEIN: Well, what the government, what this administration has done, finally Congress passed a legislation to use \$30 billion of the TARP money to inject capital, with lots of strings attached, into small banks that want it.

Now, it just passed, it remains to be seen whether these small banks are going to want it. The experience of the big banks with TARP funds was they couldn't get out of it fast enough because of the extra, as I say, strings that came with it.

This is, technically, not part of TARP, but if you're a small banker, and you can avoid it, you might not want it.

I think what can be done...

CALMES: Executive compensation isn't going to be a big issue, so.

(UNKNOWN): You might be surprised, actually.

(UNKNOWN): Well, you know, it depends on, who knows, \$250,000, I bet there are a lot of small bankers who make \$250,000, and that's the max...

KRUGMAN: I did some homework on the Georgia, you know, Georgia's the bank failure capital, and the executive compensation issues (inaudible).

FELDSTEIN: Let me see how I can say it best, if a bank sells off some -- small bank sells off some of these impaired commercial real estate, they're going to take a hit to their capital. Instead of immediately forcing them to cut back on their lending, the supervisors could agree, in advance, that for that source of reductions in capital, they would have a number of years to work it out. So they could amortize that reduction in capital over, say, four or five years.

So that would give a strong incentive for these small banks to sell off the problem loans, that would give them cash that they could use to do more spending. And that wouldn't require any increase in any congressional action.

CALMES: Do either of you want add anything before I move on?

HATZIUS: Sure, so if we talk about, what else could be done, you know, I think Federal Reserve is definitely an institution to talk about. They are going to do more, almost certainly, and it's very likely to come at the next FOMC meeting, the day after the mid-term election. And the question is just whether, you know, what they will do will have a substantial effect.

I think it'll have some effect, but, you know, the numbers of -- for the total amount of asset purchases, if that's the

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route you go, buying treasuries, the numbers that are required to really move the needle a lot are very, very large.

And, I think there's going to be a natural bias towards caution on more monetary policy makers in this sort of environment. I think that's usually what happens when you're in a liquidity trap, you're at the zero bond for short-term interest rates.

You send the staffers away and ask them, you know, try to figure out what's the optimal policy here, and they go away, and they model things, and they come back with some, you know, enormously large number for the amount that needs to be purchased, and the policy makers say, "Oh, you know, are you really sure that you've taken account properly of all the tail risks that are associated with this? I mean, are your models going to be able to pick up the tail risk that, you know, maybe people are going to lose confidence, the financial markets in some diffuse sense are going to lose confidence." And so, policy makers say, you know, what you are saying makes some sense, let's take a small step in that direction.

And that's why, I think, in this type of situation, stimulus tends to be, basically, underprovided, relative to what's necessary.

And I suspect that that's what we're going to find again. They're going to do quite a lot, but I think it's probably still going to fall short of what (inaudible).

KRUGMAN: And then there's the trap, the same thing, I think in a milder form, that happened with fiscal stimulus. You do something which is in the right direction, but inadequate. And then people say, "Well, that didn't work."

CALMES: Right.

KRUGMAN: And so instead of increasing the dosage until you get it right, you just -- you give up on the thing altogether.

And we -- well, all of this is very familiar, if you look at -- if you study Japan in the '90s. You know, I'm...

CALMES: I thought we were trying to avoid that?

KRUGMAN: Yes, but in fact we are not doing exactly what the Japanese did, we're doing worse. Right? We're -- monetary policy was a little bit more aggressive, but not enough to really make a difference. Fiscal policy has been less aggressive, and shorter lived. So, no, I mean, it's...

HATZIUS: You mean we're doing worse because we've got a larger, larger output gap?

KRUGMAN: We have a larger output gap, we have a surge in the unemployment rate in a way they never did. And so the amount of mass suffering -- and also the political -- the exhaustion of the political will to act is coming much

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more quickly in our case. So I think we are, actually, going to -- on the current track, we're going to look at Japan's lost decade as a success story, compared to our experience.

(UNKNOWN): What should we do?

KRUGMAN: Well, I mean, it's very hard to do -- what we should be doing is a really big dose of stimulus on all of these fronts. We should be trying to get bank lending going, we should be trying to help homeowners, we should be -- but, above all, we should have another large round of fiscal stimulus, and another large round of quantitative easing. Basically, the kitchen sink, throw everything at it.

And if you ask me for ways that we can solve this problem that live within the constraints of policymakers, who really don't want to do anything bold, and, in Congress don't want to do anything at all, I don't know that I can answer that question. You can't -- that's calling for magic, for creating a policy that does huge things, without actually expending any effort.

FELDSTEIN: So, Jan pointed out that -- well, let me go a different thing. Let see if we can find something that might happen that might move us out of this. We saw the Euro fall from 160 to about 120, very quickly. What happens if the U.S. experiences a comparable fall on a trade weighted basis, a 25 percent fall in the value of the dollar?

KRUGMAN: Yes.

FELDSTEIN: That would certainly give a jolt that wouldn't -- and that might happen because we're not doing something. In other words, the world may, having looked at the problems in the U.S. and elsewhere may say, gosh, there are a lot of big problems there, here in the U.S., the fiscal deficits are enormous. Paul talked about the last big fiscal experiment that got us out of a deep recession was World War II. At the end of World War II, we had a debt to GDP ratio of 109 percent. That's pretty close to what is now forecast for 2020, roughly, 100 percent, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

So if the world looks at all of that, and says, these guys are in trouble, "Why are we holding so many dollars? Why are we continuing to invest in dollar securities?" one of the effects could be a very substantial fall in the dollar. I'm not predicting it, I'm not wishing for it, I'm just saying that if that happened, that would be one of the ways out of this.

KRUGMAN: The problem is that, that leaving aside the renminbi issue, which is something I, obviously, write about, the other currencies against which the dollar would have to fall, are the euro and the yen, and we really are talking about a race between the halt, the lame and the blind here, right? So it is a little hard to tell that story.

HATZIUS: I guess one other thing I'd say, if it happens quickly, then it probably would coincide with instability in -- the sort of scenario that you're laying out, financial markets, so you would probably lose, in terms of the impact on

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economic activity, what you'd gain on the currency side.

If it happens more gradually, then, yes, I think (inaudible) be helpful, and it wouldn't be as helpful as it was in other countries that went through, you know, a large credit boom/busts that were ultimately followed by big currency depreciation that were much smaller than the United States, because the U.S. only exports 10 percent of its GDP, so it's not Korea, or Sweden in the 1990s, but it'd be helpful nonetheless. And the move that we have seen over the last couple of months has certainly helped.

FELDSTEIN: And it's not just exports, it's net exports, so if exports go up a bit, and imports come down a bit because foreign goods become more expensive, so American's spend their money buying services here in the United States, that moves the trade balance by 2 percent of GDP. That's a big deal, because as you said, that's what fiscal policy -- that's what we may be losing in the fiscal policy. That's what we need to start bringing down the unemployment rate.

CALMES: Let me move from the immediate term to the medium term, longer term, with an issue that is very much in the moment, but very important to the medium and longer term. That's the extension or not of the Bush tax cuts. The CBO wrote just last week that compared with the options examined here for extending the expiring tax cuts, and those options were, you either do all of them permanently, all of them temporarily, just those for so-called "middle class" temporarily, or permanently. So four options.

Various other options for temporary cuts would by 2020, double our deficit projections, and it was only, I think, six weeks ago that the opposition was making a big issue of deficits. That's less of an issue in the campaigns now that Bush tax cuts have taken their place. But even if President Obama got his way, and it was just for 98 percent of Americans, just up to \$250,000, the deficit would be four-fifths as large by 2020 projected.

So, with that, I mean, Marty, you've put in print what you think should happen, but if you could just each quickly address: What about the Bush tax cuts?

FELDSTEIN: What I put in print a few months ago was that, I think, we should have -- this is not the time for a tax increase. The economy is very weak. It's very uncertain, so keep the current tax rules for two years; at the end of two years, clean slate. No promises going forward. So relative to the president's proposal to have the middle-income tax cuts permanent, that reduces the end-of- decade deficit by \$2 trillion dollars. That's a lot of money.

So I think, and then when Peter Orszag escaped from the administration, his first thing was to write a piece for your fine newspaper saying the same thing, that he thinks they should do two years, and then clean slate.

CALMES: But Peter and you both are good economist, great economists, but politically, if you're going to have a Congress that's going to have more Republicans at a minimum and perhaps be controlled by Republicans, what possible, what possibility is there that there would be an agreement to end those after two years?

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FELDSTEIN: Well, you're asking me whether...

CALMES: I mean, this is where I ask...

FELDSTEIN: ... the Congress go from the -- OK.

CALMES: The, you know, Congress...

FELDSTEIN: So here we are in December, so we've gotten through the election and the choice is we do nothing, in which case, all of the taxes end. That seems like a disaster scenario. Or there's a negotiation, in which Republican leadership, the president, say, we -- the future is uncertain. The short term is clearer.

We need the tax cut now. The Republicans have twisted my arm, and said that in order to get the middle class tax cut through the Congress, I'm going to have to agree against my wishes to giving a tax cut to the folks over \$250,000, but I'll do that.

And we'll come back, but they've agreed that this is a temporary proposal, and we'll see where the fiscal situation is. We'll see whether this new fiscal commission comes up with some other ways of raising revenue or cutting spending.

So I can certainly believe that it's more likely that there will be some compromise than that we will just fall off the cliff and allow the taxes to rise in this very weak, uncertain environment that we're talking about.

Because the president would have to think, if there is the double dip, what is it going to be blamed on? It's going to be blamed on letting taxes go up. He doesn't want that. So that's why I'm an optimist about a compromise coming out of this.

KRUGMAN: I would guess there would be couple things. First, if we're talking about extending the tax cuts only temporarily, then that is a temporary tax cut, at least in principle, right? And having read my Milton Friedman theory of the consumption function, I should believe that that should have very little effect on consumption; that if people really believe that the tax -- that taxes will go up two years later, they -- it should have very little -- they should cut their spending almost as much as they would if they go up immediately.

Now, we know that's not true of a lot of people because, first of all, people don't make those kinds of calculations, but also, because they are constrained. They can't. They can borrow only at 18 percent interest. They don't have assets. The pure economics case for saying if you're going to do -- extend the tax cuts, that there's really no point in extending it at the top end, is that people making more than \$250,000 a year are the least likely to face those kinds of constraints.

And we should bear in mind, by the way, the difference between the Obama middle class only, and full, although it's

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going to affect everybody in the top 2 percent of the population, the majority of the actual difference, the majority of the additional tax cut goes to the top tenth of a percent of a population. So we really should think of this as not being about people who earned more than \$250,000 a year, and could be people who are making more than \$2 million a year. And these are people who are very likely to be able to actually do permanent income tax calculations.

So on that grounds there's no reason to extend the upper, the high-end tax cuts. And I guess I am -- I have a very strong sense that we were presented with the unique opportunity to take at least a small step towards fiscal responsibility by the fact that the 2001 tax cut was written, because with (inaudible) reconciliation, actually, was written in such a way that the whole turned into a pumpkin on December 31st of this year. And that if we missed that opportunity, it's going to be very, very hard ever to get back to doing any of it.

So I think the macro cost of not extending the high-end tax cuts is trivial, and the political costs could be very high. It would be interesting, if you really wrote it so that the whole thing expires in two years.

FELDSTEIN: Yes, that is certainly my... KRUGMAN: Two things. My guess is actually Republicans would not go along with it. That they would prefer to -- that that would be their first fight. That they would -- and that they would say, Obama is willing to -- is going to make all your taxes go up in two years and that this would be -- that we would basically, if that's -- if Obama caves on that instead of pushing them into the fight over the high-end tax cuts, that the government shutdown instead of happening sometime late next year, happens late this year.

CALMES: And it's not a small factor in this equation that President Obama is committed by his campaign pledge not to raise taxes in his first term, although two years from now would be the very end of his first term, it would be a difficult position to be in for him as well.

FELDSTEIN (?): This doesn't commit him to raising taxes during his first term.

CALMES: It does if the opposition is defining the expiration of the Bush tax cut (audio gap)

FELDSTEIN: I think the president says we can't afford \$700 billion, but that's the 10-year cost, not the two-year cost, and for some reason he thinks we can afford the -- we can't afford the \$700 billion, but we can afford the \$2 trillion.

CALMES: Three trillion.

FELDSTEIN: I've never understood that arithmetic.

KRUGMAN: Just -- but I just think that trying to think through psychological effects here, I mean, my -- I don't think any of this is reality-based. And I think trying to count -- trying to assuage small business people by convincing them that the president really likes them after all. I think that they -- that a large number of the people who are saying this also believe he's just -- he's getting ready to impose sharia law any day now.

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(LAUGHTER)

So, yes, I mean, basically, if you were setting out to devise a stimulus for this economy, it would look nothing like the Bush tax cuts. It's a completely crazy set up, so obviously -- obviously, there are much better ways to use this, and if we had the political ability to actually have an intelligent response, we'd get rid of those cuts, and have a large raft of other programs, some of them taking the form of tax cuts, some of them transfer payments, and a lot of just plain spending -- not going to happen.

CALMES: Yes. You'll pass?

(LAUGHTER)

I'm going to -- one, we'll ask a big question, and that is yesterday Ben Bernanke in Rhode Island was trying to make the argument that has just sort of stymied the administration, but it's we're going to see his -- President Bush's -- President Obama's fiscal commission tried to thread this needle in the coming weeks, where Mr. Bernanke said, you know, we don't want to be constraining right now for the next two years, really, but after that. We need to be taking action now that signals that we are going to get control of our fiscal picture over time.

The public -- you're going to have a election that's going to elect more Republicans. Do you think it's possible to, sort of, get to the point where you can, you know, have more stimulus in the next years, given the Congress you're dealt, and, but take actions in the next two years that would be long term -- have long term benefit.

FELDSTEIN: You cut out \$2 trillion, do exactly what you said Ben Bernanke said we should be doing. That is, you keep the tax cuts in place for two years. That's the issue that's on the table. There are a lot of other things that you can imagine, but that's the big issue that's on the table, and it's about long-term, \$2 trillion dollars; short-term, keeping it on so that you don't depress the economy even more.

KRUGMAN: Some day, I think -- I mean -- I just think -- I think it's politically going to be a disastrous thing to basically let that -- let them get the foot in the door on those high-end tax cuts. I think they go away now or never. Something I just think we ought to say here is -- to -- why would we believe that two years from now we're going to be ready to return to business as usual?

I think that's almost surely too short a time period, and we really should, if we were able to have a mature discussion of this, which we're not, we would be talking about conditions, rather than dates. I mean, the point at which you want to switch to fiscal restraint is when you're no longer in the liquidity trap, the point at which the Fed would be raising rates under it's normal rules, and in which you can essentially make a deal, where the Fed will hold off on rate rises so as to offset the contractionary effects of fiscal austerity.

And we're not having -- it seems extremely unlikely that we'll be there in two years. Go back to our discussion at the beginning. If we think if you do some kind of Taylor rule, I think any kind of Taylor rule, it would say that we

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probably shouldn't be looking at the Fed funds rate moving off to zero, but hopefully something comes along, but it's unlikely to happen.

I think even if you take the CBO forecast, that isn't likely to happen until late 2013 or 2014. And the CBO forecast is almost surely too optimistic, so two years is not the right number.

FELDSTEIN: That's -- that may well be true. When I first started flirting with the idea that we needed a fiscal stimulus was early 2008, and I testified, and I think I wrote something for either the Post or the Journal, saying that it ought to be conditioned, rather than a date; that we should have a triggering mechanism that triggered a fiscal stimulus if some what then seemed like terrible thing happened -- the unemployment rate, or I can't remember what my triggering mechanism was -- but something about job growth. And it didn't get very far.

So maybe the world could be persuaded to do something like this, which triggered off an unemployment rate.

KRUGMAN: Can I just -- by the way, just back -- by -- at the end of 2008, we came in -- I was looking at one of the Reinhart Rogoff papers comparing what happens in severe financial crises, and in average in those crises the unemployment rate rises by about 7 percentage points, and doesn't start to come down until it's something that was way smaller than the shock we appear to be facing.

And so far, as Ken Rogoff says, it's -- we are now facing a garden variety severe financial crisis, which is kind of a funny turn of phrase, but we're actually pretty much tracking down the middle bear. And if that's the case, then we -- to deal with this, we would have to be prepared to do very unconventional economics for a very extended period, and the problem is that that realization has not sunk in at all.

HATZIAS: I think triggering mechanisms are a great idea. I think -- I also think they're incredibly difficult to implement, and that's I think true on the fiscal side, and even true on the monetary side. I mean, the Fed's been discussing strengthening the commitment to low interest rates, and basically near-zero rates by saying we're not going to hike until some particular economic condition has been reached.

But it's just very, very difficult to come up with something that you're actually comfortable with in terms of, you know, locking something in and then throwing away the key. So, I think in practice, you know, I think an unemployment trigger, for example, whether specified in terms of a level or in terms of the cumulative decline in the unemployment rate from the peak as a trigger for when you might see some fiscal restraint, I think, in principle is a very good idea. I just don't see it happening.

FELDSTEIN: You could never sell that in the Fed though, because too many of FOMC members say we don't do unemployment; we do price stability. So it would have to be in terms of deflation.

HATZIAS: Oh, sure, sure. No, I think you're right. Within the Fed, it'd be more focused on inflation, rather than on unemployment, maybe, some kind of combination, but more on inflation. I just mean, in principle, you know, in

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principle it's a similar debate and it's difficult to actually implement.

CALMES: Well, I think we've reached the end of our hour. And I've got, like, so many more questions, but I'll spare you them, and spare the audience, and thank you very much. This was an honor to do this and be with these men here up on stage. So thank them.

(APPLAUSE)

END

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