April 14, 1999 A State Strategy for Increasing Child Support Payments from Low-Income Fathers and Improving the Well-Being of Their Children Through Economic Incentives
by Wendell E. Primus and Charita L. CastroAs welfare reform encourages families to rely on earnings and eventually moves them off of public assistance, income from the child support system will become an increasingly more important mechanism for providing income to children in single-parent, low-income families. Many poor children in single-parent families will have little chance of escaping poverty, and may face an increased risk of being pushed deeper into poverty, unless they are able to benefit from the earnings of their father paid in the form of child support as well as a combination of their mother's earnings and government assistance in the form of earned income tax credits, food stamps, child care subsidies, health insurance, and cash assistance when necessary.
Unfortunately, only a modest fraction of poor children in single-parent families currently receive child support income from their noncustodial parents. The proportion of never-married mothers whose children receive child support payments is especially low around 20 percent. Research indicates that more than $34 billion in potential child support income goes unpaid each year and that almost two-thirds of single mothers receive no support.(1)
This paper argues that states should embark upon a new approach to the problem of non-payment of child support and inadequate child support payments by low-income fathers. The central thrust of this approach would be the addition of economic incentives for the payment of child support. The key components would be a new system of matching payments or subsidies to children when child support pay-ments are made on their behalf by low-income noncustodial fathers, and significant disregards of child support collections in calculating TANF benefits when custodial parents are still receiving welfare. By subsidizing child support payments and ensuring that those payments actually benefit the children of noncustodial parents, the intent of the proposal is to encourage low-income fathers to provide support on behalf of their children and to improve the well-being of those children. The proposal also highlights the need to avoid excessive child support orders that exceed the noncustodial father's ability to pay child support.
This strategy for subsidizing child support payments would be a supplement to, and not a substitute for, vigorous and effective child support enforcement efforts that hold noncustodial fathers legally responsible for the provision of financial support for their children. The strategy is likely to be most successful if accompanied by: employ-ment services (including publicly-funded transitional jobs when needed) to bolster the earnings of low-income noncustodial fathers; a broader range of counseling, peer group support, parenting, and mediation services to promote noncustodial fathers' involve-ment in the lives of their children; and accompanying changes in the culture of child support enforcement offices to assist noncustodial fathers in securing employment and becoming or remaining involved with their children. In addition, when appropriate for low-income fathers, issues of child support arrearages, the size of child support orders, and more flexible modification of those orders need to be addressed.
Individual elements of this strategy, including child support subsidies and expanded employment services for noncustodial parents, could be implemented immediately by states. The broader vision of a restructured system of incentives and supports for low-income noncustodial fathers, with the full range of components outlined above, is as yet untested. For this reason, states may choose to begin work on these more ambitious reforms by mounting pilot projects in one or several communities to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and to assess whether it seems promising as a means of increasing child support payments and improving the well-being of children.
Incentives for Low-income Noncustodial Fathers to Pay Child Support
There are many reasons why low-income noncustodial fathers often fail to pay child support on their children's behalf. Unemployment and underemployment are key factors limiting the ability of low-income fathers to meet their child support obligations. Some noncustodial parents choose not to pay because of strained relationships with the custodial parents, conflicts over visitation rights, or concerns that custodial parents will not spend the funds wisely.(2) Others no doubt refuse to pay simply because they do not care about their children or reject the notion that they have a responsibility to provide financial support for their children.
Within this range of explanations, however, considerable evidence also supports the view that many noncustodial fathers are able to pay child support and would be willing to do so if they believed the child support system was fair and designed to improve the well-being of their children. Some fathers view the system as unfair because it is difficult to modify or adjust children support orders and to prevent the accumulation of large arrearages when their economic circumstances change and they are truly unable to meet their support obligations.(3) Perhaps more importantly, many noncustodial fathers (and custodial mothers) are discouraged and frustrated by the fact that child support payments in many instances yield no benefits for their children. When their children live in households that receive public assistance, some or all of the child support paid by noncustodial fathers typically is kept by state and federal governments as reimbursement for the cost of that assistance. While understandable from the vantage point of state and federal policymakers, the corrosive result is that noncustodial fathers often have no real incentive to meet their child support obligations.
The expectation that low-income noncustodial fathers will cooperate with child support enforcement efforts when their children derive little or no benefit from their child support payments is unrealistic at best. As one observer noted, "to many low-income noncustodial parents of children on public assistance, the biggest incentive for making regular and timely payment of child support (assuming that they actually had income from which to pay such support) would be knowing that their paying child support makes a real difference in their children's lives."(4)
One option available to states to create incentives for child support payment is to disregard a substantial portion of the child support payment when calculating welfare (TANF) payments to custodial families. The 1996 federal welfare law repealed a requirement that states "pass through" the first $50 in child support payments to custodial parents and their children rather than retaining the full amount as reimbursement for cash assistance. While 16 states have chosen to preserve a pass-through and two states have adopted a more generous pass-through in their TANF program than previously required under federal law, the remaining 33 states have eliminated the pass-through completely.(5) Only one state Wisconsin now passes through the entire amount of child support paid by the noncustodial father to the custodial mother and their children.
Even in the minority of states that have retained the $50 pass-through, the income gain for custodial families typically is reduced further by an offsetting reduction in food stamp benefits (since most TANF households also receive food stamps). For example, if a noncustodial father pays $250 in child support and a state passes through $50 to the custodial family, food stamp benefits to the custodial family are reduced by $15 as a result of the increase in income. Thus, the noncustodial father's children will gain only $35 in additional income as a result of his $250 child support payment. This high rate of effective taxation (86 percent) leaves the noncustodial parent with little incentive to meet his child support obligations and make payments through the formal child support enforcement system.(6)
In order to increase collections and improve child well-being, all states should significantly expand their child support disregards. In calculating the TANF payment, the state could establish a fixed flat amount to be disregarded (e.g., $100 or $200 per month), provide a disregard equal to a specified percentage of the monthly child support collections (e.g. 50 percent), or combine these two approaches. States also could choose to treat payments received from noncustodial parents in the same manner as they now treat the earnings of custodial parents.
Expanded child support disregards would do a great deal to restore incentives for payment of child support and to improve children's well-being. At the same time, this approach by itself has substantial limitations. First, the low earnings of many noncustodial father still will prevent them from providing financial support at a level commensurate with their children's needs. Second, child support disregards will improve the well-being of children in TANF households but they have no effect on the income available to support low-income children living in non-TANF households.
A system for subsidizing child support payments made by low-income fathers would enhance their ability to improve their children's well-being, and it would do so in circumstances when custodial parents were struggling to support those children without relying upon welfare. For both these reasons, states should consider the establishment of demonstration projects that would test the feasibility of matching payments or subsidies for child support paid by low-income noncustodial fathers as another option for increasing economic incentives to pay child support.
Key Elements of a Child Support Subsidy Plan
Economists often argue that positive incentives subsidies provided directly or through the tax system can influence individual behavior and encourage desired activities. The federal tax code contains a number of effective provisions that promote work effort by custodial parents and help them meet the basic needs of their children (including the Earned Income Tax Credit, dependent exemptions, and child tax credits), and federal benefit programs also offer help to low-income custodial parents in order to improve the well-being of their children. No similar incentives currently exist to promote work effort and encourage child support payments by noncustodial parents.(7) Of course, there would be little policy rationale or political support for extending similar tax incentives or earnings subsidies to noncustodial parents in circumstances in which they fail to meet their legal obligations to pay child support. However, a plan to match or subsidize child support payments could be effective in increasing the amount of child support paid by low-income noncustodial parents and serve as an important complement to current public policies designed to improve children's well-being.
In theory, incentives for child support payments by noncustodial parents could be structured within the federal tax code in a manner similar to those available to promote work among low-income custodial parents. In practice, any attempt to provide such incentives would require a high level of coordination between the federal tax and child support enforcement systems, leading to complicated new tax forms and an incentive system that was extremely difficult to administer.
A more practical and potentially effective option for states to consider is the provision of matching payments or subsidies directly to custodial parents based on the income of noncustodial parents and the level of child support payments they make. While there are many alternative designs that states might consider, the basic elements of such an approach would include:
- A structure of matching payments to be made by the state to custodial families for every dollar of child support paid by low-income noncustodial parents, with matching rates reduced for noncustodial parents with higher incomes and subsidies eventually phasing out completely for noncustodial parents with incomes above a specified level;
- Administrative arrangements (most likely within state or county child support enforcement agencies) for verifying child support payments by eligible noncustodial parents and issuing matching payments to custodial families in an accurate and timely manner; and
- Provisions within the state TANF program to ensure that a substantial portion of child support payments are passed through to custodial families and that receipt of matching payments by custodial families does not affect their TANF benefit levels or eligibility for other services and support provided by the state to such families. (These payments will result in food stamp reductions for such families.)
There are a myriad of possible subsidy levels and phase-out rates that could be used as a structure for child support matching payments. The key decisions to be made by the state in establishing this structure are: (1) the maximum rate at which matching payments will be provided; (2) the range of noncustodial parent income over which this maximum rate will be applied; (3) the extent to which this matching rate will be reduced for noncustodial parents with incomes above this range; and (4) the income level beyond which noncustodial parents will no longer qualify for matching payments.
Table 1 illustrates three different options for this matching rate structure. The first option (shown in Column 1) offers a one-to-one matching rate for child support payments made by noncustodial parents with incomes of up to $9,000, and then phases out gradually so that matching payments are not provided when the incomes of non-custodial parents exceed $18,000. Under this option, if a noncustodial parent with an annual income of less than $9,000 pays $1,000 in child support, the state would contribute $1,000 in matching payments to the custodial family. The second option (Column 2) begins with a more generous two-to-one matching rate but phases out much more quickly, so that noncustodial parents with incomes exceeding $15,000 are not eligible for matching payments. Finally, the third option (Column 3) illustrates an intermediate matching rate that remains constant for all noncustodial parents with incomes up to $12,000 and then phases out slowly so that all such parents with incomes up to $26,000 are eligible for some level of matching payments.
Table 1
Three Illustrative Subsidy Rates of Child Support Payments
Depending on Income Level of Noncustodial ParentIncome of Noncustodial Parent
Matching Rate
Matching Rate
Matching Rate
0-8,000
1.00
2.00
1.50
8,001-9,000
1.00
1.80
1.50
9,001-10,000
0.90
1.60
1.50
10,001-11,000
0.80
1.40
1.50
11,001-12,000
0.70
1.20
1.50
12,001-13,000
0.60
1.00
1.40
13,001-14,000
0.50
0.80
1.30
14,001-15,000
0.40
0.60
1.20
15,001-16,000
0.30
0.40
1.10
16,001-17,000
0.20
0.20
1.00
17,001-18,000
0.10
0.00
0.90
18,001-19,000
0.00
0.00
0.80
26,001 and above
0.00
0.00
0.00
Note: The table presents a simplified example. The actual table that should be used would be in $50 or $100 intervals and the decline in the subsidy rate would be no more than .01, not 0.1. Each of these alternatives works in much the same manner as the current federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). As income rises from zero to a level approaching or slightly exceeding that generated by full-time work at the minimum wage, the matching rate remains constant. Within this range, however, the amount of matching payments to custodial families typically would rise because child support orders would increase with increases in the income of noncustodial parents. Beyond this income range, the matching rate as well as the amount of matching payments declines and eventually phases out completely.
Local child support enforcement offices appear to be the logical choice for administering this system of matching payments in each community. Under current law, these agencies establish the initial amount of the child support order (with the consent of the court) and they also collect child support payments from noncustodial parents. It should be administratively feasible for these agencies to determine the amount of any matching payment based on the type of structure outlined above and then to send both child support and matching payments to the custodial family.(8)
Within the broader framework of their TANF programs, states could proceed with these new initiatives on a statewide basis or undertake demonstration projects to test the feasibility of this approach. If a state revises its TANF eligibility criteria to include children who have noncustodial parents with incomes below specified levels (and who meet other criteria set by the state to ensure that they reside in a needy family), it is free to use either federal TANF funds or state "maintenance of effort" (MOE) funds for matching payments and the costs of administering these programs or demonstration projects. To the extent that custodial families receive only these matching payments and no other cash assistance under TANF, they also constitute child-only assistance that is not subject to the time limits or work requirements imposed by the 1996 federal welfare law.
Child Support Orders for Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers
In many states, combinations of improved child support pass-through/disregard polices and a child support subsidy plan could enhance greatly the incentives of low-income noncustodial fathers to pay child support and thereby improve the well-being of their children. In a substantial number of other states, however, the size of child support orders poses an additional and perhaps overwhelming barrier to the payment of child support by such fathers on a regular basis. For example, a noncustodial father in California with an income of $10,000 would have an annual child support order of $3,216 under current state guidelines; the same father in Maryland would have a child support order of $2,940. When low-income fathers are expected to pay such a large proportion of their earnings for child support, they are likely to view this obligation as either unreasonable or impossible to meet and other incentives for child support payment are likely to be ineffective.
Because child support orders are established in accordance with guidelines established by the state, every state can and should review the level of payments expected of low-income noncustodial parents to ensure that they are reasonable. Excessive child support orders are counterproductive, often leading noncustodial fathers to move into the underground economy and avoid all payments on behalf of their children. At the same time, proposals to reduce child support orders for low-income fathers even when they are very high can be controversial because such revisions have the effect in some cases of reducing child support payments made to poor custodial families. These policy tradeoffs, seemingly pitting noncustodial parents against custodial families, frequently stymie progress in reviewing state child support guidelines.
States that are concerned about the size of child support orders for low-income fathers and about the difficult choices they pose should consider adding an additional element to their child support subsidy plan: a cap on the proportion of income that low-income fathers will be expected to pay in child support. This option is attractive in such states because matching payments from the state can be structured to offset any income losses to custodial families that otherwise would result from reductions of child support orders in those instances in which noncustodial fathers are paying the amount ordered. Both custodial families and low-income noncustodial fathers would be better off under such a plan, and major impediments to the payment of child support by those fathers would be removed.(9)
To illustrate this approach, Table 2 shows the effects of a plan that combines child support subsidies and a cap on child support orders for two sets of hypothetical families in the state of California.(10) In these examples, a one-to-one matching rate for child support payments is used, with that rate phasing out on the schedule specified in Column 1 of Table 1 . Child support and any matching payments received by custodial families are treated under TANF as though they all were earnings of the custodial parent (i.e., the state's TANF earned income disregard is applied to the combined total of child support payments and earnings). Finally, child support orders are capped at a level equal to the sum of the following: 5 percent of the noncustodial father's net income up to $5,000; 25 percent of net income between $5,000-$10,000, and 35 percent on net income above $10,000. In California, this formula would reduce the child support order for a noncustodial father with an income of $10,000 from nearly one-third of his income to slightly more than 10 percent.
Table 2
Two Illustrative Comparisons of Disposable Income for A Custodial Family
(Mother and 2 children) and a Single Non-Custodial Parent Between
Current Law and Proposal for the State of California 1998Custodial Family with No Earnings and a Noncustodial Parent with Earnings of $10,000
Custodial Family with an Earnings of $10,000 and Noncustodial Parent with Earnings of $10,000
Annual Child Support Order
(Annual Dollar Amounts)
Current Law
Proposal3,216
1,0693,828
1,069Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings
Current Law
Proposal32.2
10.738.3
10.7Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers
(Annual Dollar Amounts)
Current Law(Order Ignored)
Current Law (Order Paid)
Proposal9,530
9,950
11,02817,066
17,486
18,489Effective Tax Rate on Child Support
Current Law
Proposal86.9
(40.1)89.0
(33.1)Income as a Percentage of Poverty
Custodial Family1
Current Law
Proposal76.0
84.3133.6
141.3Noncustodial Parent1
Current Law
Proposal60.5
86.253.3
86.21 Takes into account earnings, federal taxes, child support paid, food stamps and TANF benefits and work expenses.
The effects of this subsidy plan as reflected in Table 2 demonstrate some of the potential benefits of this approach:
- The income of the custodial family in these two hypothetical cases would increase substantially. Depending upon the amount of the custodial parent's earnings and whether one assumes that child support actually would be paid under current law, the rise in incomes shown in Table 2 reflects gains of between 6 percent and 16 percent.
- Incentives for noncustodial parents to pay child support are dramatically improved. Under current law in California, effective tax rates on child support payments to custodial parents on TANF reach nearly 90 percent (i.e., every $1.00 in child support paid yields only between 11 and 13 cents in additional income for the custodial family, with the bulk of such payments retained by state and federal governments). Under the proposed subsidy plan, every $1.00 in child support payments would raise the income of the custodial family by between $1.33 and $1.40 as a result of state matching payments.
- Noncustodial fathers who meet their child support obligations also would end up substantially better off financially than they do under current law. In these hypothetical cases, the noncustodial father's income (after subtracting their child support payments to the custodial family) rises to 86 percent of the poverty line.
The formula illustrated in Table 2 works in California but will not necessarily be appropriate in other states. Some states still have inadequate earned income disregards for custodial parents, and if these low disregards also are applied to child support payments the formula outlined above will not generate the intended benefits for custodial families. For example, if this exact approach were utilized in the state of Maryland, custodial families could end up with less income than under current law even after they receive child support from noncustodial fathers and matching payments from the state. This unacceptable result serves as a reminder that, in any plan that includes a provision to cap child support orders, each aspect of the plan's formula and their interactions must be examined carefully to ensure that they yield the intended results. The details of any plan must be tailored specifically to respond to the unique circumstances and needs of each individual state.
Conclusion
The potential benefits of a child support subsidy plan along the lines described in this paper for both custodial families and noncustodial fathers are quite significant. Numerous questions regarding the design, cost, and eventual impact of such a plan also remain. For this reason, we believe that a series of demonstration projects by states is the logical next step in the development of the broader vision for a restructured child support program. We are able to provide advice and technical assistance to states that are interested in this approach and its many possible variations.
We urge states to adopt a plan for child support subsidies on a larger scale. The risks of immediate implementation or statewide demonstrations of such a plan are modest. Even if a child support subsidy plan yielded no increase in the willingness of noncustodial fathers to pay child support, the investment of federal and/or state funds would directly improve the well-being of children on whose behalf child support payments are made. In contrast, the risks of inaction are substantial, reflected in the persistent patterns of non-payment of child support by many low-income noncustodial fathers and high rates of poverty among their children.
Appendix A
Methodology and Description TablesThe purpose of the enclosed tables is to simulate what would happen to the disposable incomes of low-income custodial families and noncustodial parents under both current law and a proposed set of child support policy changes. In addition, the specific methodology of how the figures were derived is included to provide states with a guide in how to replicate these calculations in their own states. The impact of the proposal is also illustrated with manyexamples for three states which have high, medium, and low benefit levels California, Maryland, and Texas, respectively are included in the analysis.
Methodology
The tables illustrate hypothetical family scenarios and were created by calculating the appropriate benefits, taxes and child support payments for families with various levels of earnings and then calculating the resulting disposable income earnings plus benefits, minus taxes, child care and work expenses, and plus or minus child support payments for these families. Listed below are the programs modeled in the analysis, the programs not included in the analysis, assumptions made for the analysis, and the program parameters (maximum TANF benefit, earnings disregard, and child support pass-through) used for the individual states included in the analysis. Furthermore, a description of how the child support order is capped and how the subsidy payments for noncustodial parents at various levels of earnings are calculated is discussed below.
In all these illustrative examples, we assume the intact and custodial family participates and receives the appropriate amount of TANF and food stamp benefits. In addition, we assume that the non-custodial parent does not participate in the food stamps program. In all but one case, the noncustodial parent is assumed to have income above food eligibility levels. Also, all cases assume the respective states' child support guidelines are applied and the full amount of the order is paid. In many instances, this is an unrealistic assumption.
Programs Modeled in the Analysis
- TANF
- Food Stamps
- Child Support Enforcement
- Child Care (through TANF and food stamp disregards and tax policy)
- Federal Tax Policy (employee payroll, income, EITC)
Programs Not Included in the Analysis
- Health Care
- State Taxes
- Housing
Assumptions for the Analysis
Child Care
Food Stamp Shelter Deduction
Work Expenses
Tax Policy
Child Support
Participation
30% of earnings (of lower-earning spouse, if married); not to exceed $200 per month
$125
5% of earnings
$500 child tax credit is fully phased in (even though this will not be the case until 1999)
calculated using states published guidelines; assume full amount of order is paid
all families take advantage of all benefits available to them
Program Parameters Under Current Law(1)
Maximum TANF Benefit
Earnings Disregard
Child Support Pass-Through
California
$565 per month
(single-parent family of 3)
$673 per month
(two-parent family of 4)disregard $225
and
50% of remainder$50
Maryland
$388 per month
(single-parent family of 3)
$468 per month
(two-parent family of 4)disregard 26%
$0
Texas
$188 per month
(single-parent family of 3)
$226 per month
(two-parent family of 4)disregard $120
$50
Capping the Child Support Order
As discussed in the paper, the cap on the order is 5 percent of the noncustodial parent's net income up to $5,000, 25 percent of net income between $5,000-$10,000, and 35 percent on net incomes above $10,000. This cap is not intended to substitute for the considered judgment of the State and is clearly arbitrary. The Center is not endorsing this as the "right amount" for an order for a low-income non-custodial parent. Orders for low-income non-custodial parents should be reasonable and in the author's judgement current levels of orders in some states seem unrealistic.
Calculating the Subsidy
Table 1 presents the subsidy rates used for calculating the matching payment made by the state when child support is paid by the noncustodial parent. The figures in Tables 2, 3, and 4 use a maximum subsidy rate of 1.0 (column 1 of Table 1). Tables 5 and 6 subsidize child support payments at a maximum subsidy rate of 1.5 (column 2 of Table 1). The income level of the noncustodial parent determines the subsidy used for calculating the state subsidy. Once the subsidy rate is determined, the actual amount of child support paid is multiplied by the subsidy rate to yield the amount of the state subsidy:
Child Support Paid x Subsidy Rate = Government Subsidy Payment
Table 1
Income Level of Noncustodial Parent and Subsidy Rates Used for Calculating ProposalIncome of Noncustodial Parent
Subsidy Rate
Subsidy Rate
0-8,000
1.00
1.50
8,001-9,000
1.00
1.50
9,001-10,000
0.90
1.50
10,001-11,000
0.80
1.50
11,001-12,000
0.70
1.50
12,001-13,000
0.60
1.40
13,001-14,000
0.5
1.30
.
.
.
.
.
.
18,001-19,000
0.00
0.00
Description of Tables
The tables present the results of our calculations- the effects of the benefits and taxes listed above on the disposable incomes of custodial families and noncustodial parents at different levels of earnings. These tables compare how families fare under current law to how they would fare under the proposal. Under each of the following headings: (1) Annual Child Support Order, (2) Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings, (3) Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers, (4) Effective Tax Rate on Child Support, and (5) Income as a Percentage of Poverty- results under current law and the proposal are presented side by side to illustrate the effect the proposal would have compared to current law for both the custodial family and noncustodial.
The custodial family's income with taxes and transfers is subdivided into three categories. The first column under the heading represents the custodial family's income with taxes and transfers when no child support is paid. The second column is simply the custodial family's earnings with taxes and transfers under current law assuming the full order is paid. The third column calculates the custodial family's income with the amount of pass through received, the capped child support order, and the government subsidy. These three columns are used to determine the effective tax rate on the child support order under both current law and the proposal. In most cases, the effective tax rate on child support is lowered significantly under the proposal.
The last two columns of the table compare the custodial family and noncustodial parent's income at different earnings levels as a percentage of poverty under current law and the proposal. The poverty threshold for the custodial family is the threshold for a family of 3, or $13,086 in 1998. The poverty threshold for the noncustodial parent is the poverty threshold for one person, or $8,359 in 1998.
Some of the charts used in the presentation to the American Public Human Services Association on March 7th follow the state tables. The deleted charts were not relevant to the discussion of child support or are replaced by the fuller discussion in the paper.
Earnings | Annual Child Support Order |
Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings |
Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers |
Effective Tax Rate on Child Support |
||||||||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law3 |
Current Law |
Proposal | Current Law |
Proposal |
||||
0 |
10,000 |
3,216 |
1,069 |
32 |
11 |
9,530 |
9,950 |
11,028 |
87 |
(40) |
||||
2,500 |
7,500 |
2,532 |
617 |
34 |
8 |
11,589 |
12,009 |
12,453 |
83 |
(40) |
||||
5,000 |
5,000 |
1,716 |
218 |
34 |
4 |
13,648 |
14,068 |
13,954 |
76 |
(40) |
||||
0 |
15,000 |
4,764 |
2,163 |
32 |
14 |
9,530 |
9,950 |
11,650 |
91 |
2 |
||||
3,750 |
11,250 |
3,888 |
1,295 |
35 |
12 |
12,619 |
13,039 |
14,160 |
89 |
(19) |
||||
7,500 |
7,500 |
2,772 |
617 |
37 |
8 |
15,602 |
16,022 |
16,466 |
85 |
(40) |
||||
0 |
20,000 |
6,204 |
3,429 |
31 |
17 |
9,530 |
9,950 |
11,676 |
93 |
37 |
||||
5,000 |
15,000 |
4,764 |
2,163 |
32 |
14 |
13,648 |
14,068 |
15,768 |
91 |
2 |
||||
10,000 |
10,000 |
3,828 |
1,069 |
38 |
11 |
17,066 |
17,486 |
18,489 |
89 |
(33) |
||||
0 |
25,000 |
7,656 |
4,696 |
31 |
19 |
9,530 |
10,141 |
12,119 |
92 |
45 |
||||
6,250 |
18,750 |
5,844 |
3,113 |
31 |
17 |
14,677 |
15,097 |
18,735 |
93 |
(30) |
||||
12,500 |
12,500 |
4,032 |
1,530 |
32 |
12 |
17,725 |
18,145 |
19,438 |
90 |
(12) |
||||
0 |
30,000 |
9,096 |
5,962 |
30 |
20 |
9,530 |
11,154 |
12,562 |
82 |
49 |
||||
7,500 |
22,500 |
6,924 |
4,062 |
31 |
18 |
15,602 |
16,022 |
17,969 |
94 |
42 |
||||
15,000 |
15,000 |
4,764 |
2,163 |
32 |
14 |
17,907 |
18,639 |
20,027 |
85 |
2 |
||||
0 |
35,000 |
10,548 |
7,228 |
30 |
21 |
9,530 |
12,167 |
13,005 |
75 |
52 |
||||
8,750 |
26,250 |
8,016 |
5,012 |
31 |
19 |
16,456 |
17,757 |
19,155 |
84 |
46 |
||||
17,500 |
17,500 |
5,484 |
2,796 |
31 |
16 |
18,089 |
21,020 |
22,024 |
47 |
(41) |
||||
0 |
40,000 |
11,988 |
8,494 |
30 |
21 |
9,530 |
13,180 |
13,448 |
70 |
54 |
||||
10,000 |
30,000 |
9,096 |
5,962 |
30 |
20 |
17,066 |
19,190 |
20,098 |
77 |
49 |
||||
20,000 |
20,000 |
6,204 |
3,429 |
31 |
17 |
18,271 |
23,401 |
20,791 |
17 |
27 |
Table 2 (continued)
Income as a Percentage of Poverty 2 |
||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
|||
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
|
|
|
|||
76.0 |
84 |
61 |
86 |
|
91.8 |
95 |
49 |
72 |
|
107.5 |
107 |
36 |
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
76.0 |
89 |
85 |
116 |
|
99.6 |
108 |
63 |
94 |
|
122.4 |
126 |
47 |
72 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
76.0 |
89 |
111 |
145 |
|
107.5 |
121 |
85 |
116 |
|
133.6 |
141 |
53 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
77.5 |
93 |
137 |
173 |
|
115.4 |
143 |
105 |
138 |
|
138.7 |
149 |
72 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
85.2 |
96 |
163 |
201 |
|
122.4 |
137 |
124 |
159 |
|
142.4 |
153 |
85 |
116 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
93.0 |
99 |
189 |
229 |
|
135.7 |
146 |
144 |
180 |
|
160.6 |
168 |
98 |
131 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100.7 |
103 |
215 |
257 |
|
146.6 |
154 |
163 |
201 |
|
178.8 |
159 |
111 |
145 |
|
Note: Calculations use 1998 respective state child support and TANF
parameters and federal tax and food stamp parameters but assume the $500 child tax credit
is fully phased in (even though this will not be the case until 1999). |
Earnings |
||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||
Custodial |
Noncustodial |
Annual Child Support Order |
Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings |
Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers |
EffectiveTax Rate on Child Support |
|||||||||
Family |
Parent |
Current Law |
Proposal | Current Law |
Proposal | Current Law3 |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
0 |
10,000 |
2,940 |
1,069 |
29 |
11 |
8,044 |
8,044 |
8,987 |
100 |
12 |
||||
2,500 |
7,500 |
2,772 |
617 |
37 |
8 |
9,332 |
9,332 |
9,877 |
100 |
12 |
||||
5,000 |
5,000 |
2,220 |
218 |
44 |
4 |
10,621 |
10,621 |
10,814 |
100 |
11 |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
15,000 |
4,212 |
2,163 |
28 |
14 |
8,044 |
8,044 |
9,043 |
100 |
54 | ||||
3,750 |
11,250 |
4,008 |
1,295 |
36 |
12 |
9,977 |
10,674 |
10,847 |
83 |
33 |
||||
7,500 |
7,500 |
3,228 |
617 |
43 |
8 |
11,910 |
13,222 |
12,454 |
59 |
12 |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||
0 |
20,000 |
5,316 |
3,429 |
27 |
17 |
8,044 |
8,503 |
8,668 |
91 |
82 |
||||
5,000 |
15,000 |
5,112 |
2,163 |
34 |
14 |
10,621 |
12,478 |
11,621 |
64 |
54 |
||||
10,000 |
10,000 |
3,852 |
1,069 |
39 |
11 |
13,195 |
15,895 |
14,618 |
30 |
(33) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||
0 |
25,000 |
6,204 |
4,696 |
25 |
19 |
8,044 |
9,130 |
8,898 |
82 |
82 |
||||
6,250 |
18,750 |
6,060 |
3,113 |
32 |
17 |
11,265 |
14,175 |
12,110 |
52 |
73 |
||||
12,500 |
12,500 |
4,308 |
1,530 |
34 |
12 |
14,729 |
17,741 |
16,442 |
30 |
(12) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
30,000 |
7,008 |
5,962 |
23 |
20 |
8,044 |
9,690 |
9,129 |
77 |
82 |
||||
7,500 |
22,500 |
6,948 |
4,062 |
31 |
18 |
11,910 |
15,821 |
13,804 |
44 |
53 |
||||
15,000 |
15,000 |
4,704 |
2,163 |
31 |
14 |
15,786 |
18,585 |
16,910 |
40 |
48 |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
35,000 |
7,980 |
7,228 |
23 |
21 |
8,044 |
10,370 |
9,844 |
71 |
75 |
||||
8,750 |
26,250 |
7,788 |
5,012 |
30 |
19 |
12,554 |
17,597 |
15,656 |
35 |
38 |
||||
17,500 |
17,500 |
5,196 |
2,796 |
30 |
16 |
15,539 |
20,729 |
18,615 |
0 |
(10) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
40,000 |
8,880 |
8,494 |
22 |
21 |
8,044 |
11,000 |
10,730 |
67 |
68 |
||||
10,000 |
30,000 |
8,460 |
5,962 |
28 |
20 |
13,195 |
18,551 |
17,369 |
37 |
30 |
||||
20,000 |
20,000 |
5,640 |
3,429 |
28 |
17 |
17,196 |
22,836 |
20,625 |
0 |
0 |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table 3 (continued)
Income as a Percentage of Poverty 2 | ||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
|||
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
|
|
|
|
||
61.5 |
69 |
64 |
86 |
|
71.3 |
76 |
47 |
72 |
|
81.2 |
83 |
30 |
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
61.5 |
69 |
92 |
116 |
|
81.6 |
83 |
62 |
94 |
|
101.0 |
95 |
41 |
72 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
65.0 |
66 |
122 |
145 |
|
95.4 |
89 |
81 |
116 |
|
121.5 |
112 |
53 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
||
69.8 |
68 |
155 |
173 |
|
108.3 |
93 |
102 |
138 |
|
135.6 |
126 |
69 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
74.0 |
70 |
188 |
201 |
|
120.9 |
106 |
124 |
159 |
|
142.0 |
129 |
86 |
116 |
|
|
|
|
||
79.2 |
75 |
220 |
229 |
|
134.5 |
120 |
147 |
180 |
|
158.4 |
142 |
102 |
131 |
|
|
|
|
||
84.1 |
82 |
253 |
257 |
|
141.8 |
133 |
171 |
201 |
|
174.5 |
158 |
118 |
145 |
|
Note: Calculations use 1998 respective state child support and TANF
parameters and federal tax and food stamp parameters but assume the $500 child tax credit
is fully phased in (even though this will not be the case until 1999). |
Earnings | ||||||||||||||
Custodial |
Noncustodial |
Annual Child Support Order |
Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings |
Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers |
Effective Tax Rate on Child Support |
|||||||||
Family |
Parent |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law3 |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
0 |
10,000 |
2,196 |
1,069 |
22 |
11 |
6,364 |
6,784 |
7,861 |
81 |
(40) |
||||
2,500 |
7,500 |
1,716 |
617 |
23 |
8 |
8,205 |
8,625 |
9,069 |
76 |
(40) |
||||
5,000 |
5,000 |
1,152 |
218 |
23 |
4 |
9,039 |
9,710 |
9,345 |
42 |
(40) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
0 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
6,364 |
6,997 |
7,977 |
80 |
25 |
||||
3,750 |
11,250 |
2,436 |
1,295 |
22 |
12 |
8,622 |
9,578 |
10,164 |
61 |
(19) |
||||
7,500 |
7,500 |
1,716 |
617 |
23 |
8 |
10,961 |
12,158 |
11,825 |
30 |
(40) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
0 |
20,000 |
4,128 |
3,429 |
21 |
17 |
6,364 |
7,674 |
7,372 |
68 |
71 |
||||
5,000 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
9,039 |
11,115 |
11,022 |
34 |
8 |
||||
10,000 |
10,000 |
2,196 |
1,069 |
22 |
11 |
13,195 |
14,731 |
14,618 |
30 |
(33) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
25,000 |
5,100 |
4,696 |
20 |
19 |
6,364 |
8,351 |
8,071 |
61 |
64 |
||||
6,250 |
18,750 |
3,888 |
3,113 |
21 |
17 |
9,931 |
12,652 |
12,110 |
30 |
30 |
||||
12,500 |
12,500 |
2,676 |
1,530 |
21 |
12 |
14,729 |
16,603 |
16,442 |
30 |
(12) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
0 |
30,000 |
6,060 |
5,962 |
20 |
20 |
6,364 |
9,028 | 8,958 |
56 |
56 |
||||
7,500 |
22,500 |
4,608 |
4,062 |
20 |
18 |
10,961 |
14,189 |
13,804 |
30 |
30 |
||||
15,000 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
15,786 |
17,043 |
16,910 |
60 |
48 |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
35,000 |
7,032 |
7,029 |
20 |
20 |
6,364 |
9,705 |
9,705 |
52 |
52 |
||||
8,750 |
26,250 |
5,340 |
5,012 |
20 |
19 |
12,148 |
15,883 |
15,656 |
30 |
30 |
||||
17,500 |
17,500 |
3,648 |
2,796 |
21 |
16 |
15,539 |
19,183 |
18,615 |
0 |
(10) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
40,000 |
7,992 |
7,996 |
20 |
20 |
6,364 |
10,381 |
10,381 |
50 |
50 |
||||
10,000 |
30,000 |
6,060 |
5,962 |
20 |
20 |
13,195 |
17,439 |
17,369 |
30 |
30 |
||||
20,000 |
20,000 |
|
4,128 |
3,429 |
21 |
17 |
17,196 |
21,324 |
20,625 |
0 |
0 |
Table 4 (continued)
Income as a Percentage of Poverty 2 |
||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
|
||
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
|
|
|
|
||
51.8 |
60 |
73 |
86 |
|
65.9 |
69 |
59 |
72 |
|
74.2 |
71 |
43 |
54 |
|
|
|
|||
53.5 |
61 |
105 |
116 |
|
73.2 |
78 |
81 |
94 |
|
92.9 |
90 |
59 |
72 |
|
|
|
|
||
58.6 |
56 |
136 |
145 |
|
84.9 |
84 |
105 |
116 |
|
112.6 |
112 |
73 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
||
63.8 |
62 |
168 |
173 |
|
96.7 |
93 |
128 |
138 |
|
126.9 |
126 |
89 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
69.0 |
69 |
200 |
201 |
|
108.4 |
106 |
152 |
159 |
|
130.2 |
129 |
105 |
116 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
74.2 |
74 |
231 |
229 |
|
124.4 |
120 |
176 |
180 |
|
146.6 |
142 |
120 |
131 |
|
|
|
|
||
79.3 |
79 |
263 |
257 |
|
133.3 |
133 |
200 |
201 |
|
163.0 |
158 |
136 |
145 |
|
Note: Calculations use 1998 respective state child support and TANF
parameters and federal tax and food stamp parameters but assume the $500 child tax credit
is fully phased in (even though this will not be the case until 1999). |
Earnings | ||||||||||||||
Custodial |
Noncustodial |
|
Annual Child Support Order |
|
Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings |
|
Custodial Family's Income with Taxes and Transfers |
|
Effective Tax Rate on Child Support |
|||||
Family |
Parent |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law3 |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||
0 |
10,000 |
2,940 |
1,069 |
29 |
11 |
8,044 |
8,044 |
9,361 |
100 |
(23) |
||||
2,500 |
7,500 |
2,772 |
617 |
37 |
8 |
9,332 |
9,332 |
10,093 |
100 |
(23) |
||||
5,000 |
5,000 |
2,220 |
218 |
44 |
4 |
10,621 |
10,621 |
10,890 |
100 |
(23) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
0 |
15,000 |
4,212 |
2,163 |
28 |
14 |
8,044 |
8,044 |
10,254 |
100 |
(2) |
||||
3,750 |
11,250 |
4,008 |
1,295 |
36 |
12 |
9,977 |
10,674 |
11,573 |
83 |
(23) |
||||
7,500 |
7,500 |
3,228 |
617 |
43 |
8 |
11,910 |
13,222 |
12,670 |
59 |
(23) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
20,000 |
5,316 |
3,429 |
27 |
17 |
8,044 |
8,503 |
10,348 | 91 |
33 |
||||
5,000 |
15,000 |
5,112 |
2,163 |
34 |
14 |
10,621 |
12,478 |
12,832 |
64 |
(2) |
||||
10,000 |
10,000 |
3,852 |
1,069 |
39 |
11 |
13,195 |
15,895 |
15,067 |
30 |
(75) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
25,000 |
6,204 |
4,696 |
25 |
19 |
8,044 |
9,130 |
11,199 |
82 |
33 |
||||
6,250 |
18,750 |
6,060 |
3,113 |
32 |
17 |
11,265 |
14,175 |
13,853 |
52 |
17 |
||||
12,500 |
12,500 |
4,308 |
1,530 |
34 |
12 |
14,729 |
17,741 |
17,299 |
30 |
(68) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
30,000 |
7,008 |
5,962 |
23 |
20 |
8,044 |
9,690 |
9,129 |
77 |
82 |
||||
7,500 |
22,500 |
6,948 |
4,062 |
31 |
18 |
11,910 |
15,821 |
14,942 |
44 |
25 |
||||
15,000 |
15,000 |
4,704 |
2,163 |
31 |
14 |
15,786 |
18,585 |
18,641 |
40 |
(32) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||
0 |
35,000 |
7,980 |
7,228 |
23 |
21 |
8,044 |
10,370 |
9,844 |
71 |
75 |
||||
8,750 |
26,250 |
7,788 |
5,012 |
30 |
19 |
12,554 |
17,597 |
15,656 |
35 |
38 |
||||
17,500 |
17,500 |
5,196 |
2,796 |
30 |
16 |
15,539 |
20,729 |
20,852 |
0 |
(90) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||
0 |
40,000 |
8,880 |
8,494 |
22 |
21 |
8,044 |
11,000 |
10,730 |
67 |
68 |
||||
10,000 |
30,000 |
8,460 |
5,962 |
28 |
20 |
13,195 |
18,551 |
17,369 |
37 |
30 |
||||
20,000 |
20,000 |
5,640 |
3,429 |
28 |
17 |
17,196 |
22,836 |
23,026 |
0 |
(70) |
Table 5 (continued)
Income as a Percentage of Poverty 2 |
||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
|||
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
|
|
|
|
||
61.5 |
72 |
64 |
86 |
|
71.3 |
77 |
47 |
72 |
|
81.2 |
83 |
30 |
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
61.5 |
78 |
92 |
116 |
|
81.6 |
88 |
62 |
94 |
|
101.0 |
97 |
41 |
72 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
65.0 |
79 |
122 |
145 |
|
95.4 |
98 |
81 |
116 |
|
121.5 |
115 |
53 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
69.8 |
86 |
155 |
173 |
|
108.3 |
106 |
102 |
138 |
|
135.6 |
132 |
69 |
102 |
|
|
|
|||
74.0 |
70 |
188 |
201 |
|
120.9 |
114 |
124 |
159 |
|
142.0 |
142 |
86 |
116 |
|
|
|
|
||
79.2 |
75 |
220 |
229 |
|
134.5 |
120 |
147 |
180 |
|
158.4 |
159 |
102 |
131 |
|
|
|
|
||
84.1 |
82 |
253 |
257 |
|
141.8 |
133 |
171 |
201 |
|
174.5 |
176 |
118 |
145 |
|
Note: Calculations use 1998 respective state child support and TANF
parameters and federal tax and food stamp parameters but assume the $500 child tax credit
is fully phased in (even though this will not be the case until 1999). |
Earnings | ||||||||||||||
Custodial |
Noncustodial |
Annual Child Support Order |
Child Support Order as Percent of Noncustodial Parent's Earnings |
Custodial Family's Incomewith Taxes and Transfers |
Effective Tax Rate on Child Support |
|||||||||
Family |
Parent |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law | Proposal | Current Law3 |
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
10,000 |
2,196 |
1,069 |
22 |
11 |
6,364 |
6,784 |
8,235 |
81 |
(75) |
||||
2,500 |
7,500 |
1,716 |
617 |
23 |
8 |
8,205 |
8,625 |
9,285 |
76 |
(75) |
||||
5,000 |
5,000 |
1,152 |
218 |
23 |
4 |
9,039 |
9,710 |
9,421 |
42 |
(75) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
6,364 |
6,997 |
9,189 |
80 |
(31) |
||||
3,750 |
11,250 |
2,436 |
1,295 |
22 |
12 |
8,622 |
9,578 |
10,889 |
61 |
(75) |
||||
7,500 |
7,500 |
1,716 |
617 |
23 |
8 |
10,961 |
12,158 |
12,041 |
30 |
(75) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
20,000 |
4,128 |
3,429 |
21 |
17 |
6,364 |
7,674 |
9,052 |
68 |
22 |
||||
5,000 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
9,039 |
11,115 |
12,233 |
34 |
(48) |
||||
10,000 |
10,000 |
2,196 |
1,069 |
22 |
11 |
13,195 |
14,731 |
15,067 |
30 |
(75) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
0 |
25,000 |
5,100 |
4,696 |
20 |
19 |
6,364 |
8,351 |
10,372 |
61 |
15 |
||||
6,250 |
18,750 |
3,888 |
3,113 |
21 |
17 |
9,931 |
12,652 |
13,853 |
30 |
(26) |
||||
12,500 |
12,500 |
2,676 |
1,530 |
21 |
12 |
14,729 |
16,603 |
17,299 |
30 |
(68) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||
0 |
30,000 |
6,060 |
5,962 |
20 |
20 |
6,364 |
9,028 |
8,958 |
56 |
56 |
||||
7,500 |
22,500 |
4,608 |
4,062 |
20 |
18 |
10,961 |
14,189 |
14,942 |
30 |
2 |
||||
15,000 |
15,000 |
3,156 |
2,163 |
21 |
14 |
15,786 |
17,043 |
18,641 |
60 |
(32) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||
0 |
35,000 |
7,032 |
7,228 |
20 |
21 |
6,364 |
9,705 |
9,705 |
52 |
54 |
||||
8,750 |
26,250 |
5,340 |
5,012 |
20 |
19 |
12,148 |
15,883 |
15,656 | 30 |
30 |
||||
17,500 |
17,500 |
3,648 |
2,796 |
21 |
16 |
15,539 |
19,183 |
20,852 |
0 |
(90) |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
0 |
40,000 |
7,992 |
8,494 |
20 |
21 |
6,364 |
10,381 |
10,381 |
50 |
53 |
||||
10,000 |
30,000 |
6,060 |
5,962 |
20 |
20 |
13,195 |
17,439 |
17,369 |
30 |
30 |
||||
20,000 |
20,000 |
4,128 |
3,429 |
21 |
17 |
17,196 |
21,324 |
23,026 |
0 |
(70) |
Table 6 (continued)
Income as a Percentage of Poverty 2 | ||||
Custodial Family |
Noncustodial Parent |
|||
Current Law |
Proposal |
Current Law |
Proposal |
|
|
|
|
||
51.8 |
63 |
73 |
86 |
|
65.9 |
71 |
59 |
72 |
|
74.2 |
72 |
43 |
54 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
53.5 |
70 |
105 |
116 |
|
73.2 |
83 |
81 |
94 |
|
92.9 |
92 |
59 |
72 |
|
|
|
|
||
58.6 |
69 |
136 |
145 |
|
84.9 |
94 |
105 |
116 |
|
112.6 |
115 |
73 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
63.8 |
79 |
168 |
173 |
|
96.7 |
106 |
128 |
138 |
|
126.9 |
132 |
89 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
||
69.0 |
69 |
200 |
201 |
|
108.4 |
114 |
152 |
159 |
|
130.2 |
142 |
105 |
116 |
|
|
|
|
||
74.2 |
74 |
231 |
229 |
|
121.4 |
120 |
176 |
180 |
|
146.6 |
159 |
120 |
131 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
79.3 |
79 |
263 |
257 |
|
133.3 |
133 |
200 |
201 |
|
163.0 |
176 |
136 |
145 |
Note:
Calculations use 1998 respective state child support and TANF parameters and federal tax
and food stamp parameters but assume the $500 child tax credit is fully phased in (even
though this will not be the case until 1999). |
Endnotes:
1. 1See Elaine Sorensen, "The Benefits of Increased Child Support Enforcement," in Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, Urban Institute, 1995, pp. 55-58 and "A National Profile of Nonresident Fathers and Their Ability to Pay Child Support," in Journal of Marriage and the Family, November 1997, pp. 785-797.
2. 2Dan Bloom and Kay Sherwood. Matching Opportunities to Obligations: Lessons for Child Support Reform from the Parents' Fair Share Pilot Phase. Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, April 1994, pp. 70-73.
3. Bloom and Sherwood, p. 74.
4. Margaret Stapleton. The Unnecessary Tragedy of Fatherless Children: Welfare Reform's Opportunities for Reversing Public Policies that Drove Low-Income Fathers Out of Their Children's Lives. Clearinghouse Review, January-February 1999, p.499.
5. -
6. This interaction with the food stamp program also creates some disincentive for states to expand their child support disregards, but the benefits of such a policy far outweigh its costs.
7. Only families who live with their children receive the family EITC. Parents who do not live with their children do not qualify for the family credit, although they may be eligible for the small EITC for workers without a child in the home if their income is below $10,030 for 1998.
8. The success of a child support subsidy plan administered by local child support enforcement agencies also may depend on the ability of state and local officials to change the culture of the child support office. Just as welfare reform during the early 1990s aimed to transform the culture of welfare offices from cash disbursement offices into agencies which focus on placing mothers in the workforce, child support offices must begin to help noncustodial fathers become employed and develop stronger ties to their children. This represents a major challenge, as the first priority of child support offices must continue to be the vigorous enforcement of child support obligations and the effective collection of child support payments. Through partnerships with other public and private agencies, however, these offices can help to bolster the capacity of noncustodial fathers to meet their child support obligations and thereby improve the well-being of their children.
9. In a time-limited demonstration project in which child support subsidies come to an end, reductions in child support orders that were made as part of the demonstration also should be reviewed. In those instances in which the noncustodial father has met the reduced obligation, consideration should be given to retaining the lower child support order beyond the life of the demonstration (particularly if the non-custodial father was not paying child support prior to this reduction in the child support order).
10. The appendix describes how these calculations were performed in greater detail and provides other examples of how such a plan could work in California as well as in Maryland and Texas.
Appendix Endnote:
1. L. Jerome Gallagher, Megan Gallagher, Kevin Perese, Susan Shreiber, and Keith Watson. One Year After Welfare Reform: A Description of State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of October 1997. The Urban Institute, May 1998.