Revised October 1, 2000

A Compliance-oriented Approach to Sanctions
in State and County TANF Programs
by Heidi Goldberg and Liz Schott^1a

While this report was issued prior to the enactment of the DRA, it includes useful research on sanctions and examples of how states can craft a sanction policy that reduces noncompliance and uncovers underlying barriers to participation.

Overview

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Table of Contents I.     Background II.    Magnitude of state sanction use III.   Characteristics of families that are sanctioned  IV.  Employment rates and earnings of families that are sanctioned V.    Before noncompliance VI.   After noncompliance but before a sanction is imposed VII. After a sanction is imposed VIII. Post-sanction follow-up and services IX.   Ensure that families know how to cure a sanction and then restore benefits as soon as compliance occurs X.   Conclusion XI.  Appendices View PDF version If you cannot access the file through the link, right-click on the underlined text, click "Save Link As," download to your directory, and open the document in Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Analysis of data from states and other sources indicates that under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, states and counties have imposed sanctions that reduced or terminated benefits to several hundred thousand families.  Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, states and counties have imposed sanctions that reduced or terminated benefits to hundreds of thousands of families.⁽¹⁾ Under the federal law, states must require recipients to participate in work activities and must impose financial penalties on families that refuse, without good cause, to do so. When sanctions are imposed, some or all family members lose TANF cash benefits. The benefit loss may be partial or complete and it may be temporary or permanent, depending on the policies chosen by each state.

Many states have adopted sanction policies that are more stringent than required under federal law. In the long run, these policies may not serve, and indeed may impede, the goal of moving families from welfare to work and independence. Policies more stringent than required are found in the 36 states that impose full-family sanctions, which terminate cash assistance to the entire family, and in the 39 states that continue sanctions for fixed periods of time, even if the family has come into compliance with the requirements during the sanction period. Moreover, many states have curtailed or eliminated procedural protections for families facing a sanction.

These aggressive sanction policies appear to be aimed at families that, while able to comply with work requirements, simply refuse to do so; they were intended to send a strong message that work requirements would be enforced. Evidence after four years of TANF, however, indicates that families sanctioned for noncompliance with work requirements are not primarily those that refuse work, but rather those that face substantial barriers to employment. Sanctioned families are characterized by a high incidence of health problems and low education levels as well as a lack of transportation and child care. In addition, there is evidence that sanctioned families often do not know or understand what actions they are required to take to be in compliance or the consequences of failing to take those actions.

Research also shows that families leaving welfare due to sanctions fare less well than families that leave for other reasons. They are less likely to become employed and, if employed, have lower earnings than other families leaving welfare. In addition, sanctioned families may experience hardships resulting from the sanctions themselves; loss of income can precipitate a crisis in meeting basic needs that can lead to eviction or other circumstances that can compound a family's problems and make it more difficult for a parent to work.

By contrast, there are some states and counties that are administering their sanction policies in ways that seek to mitigate these adverse and unnecessary consequences. They are implementing policies and programs that identify families that have barriers to participation in work-related activities and that emphasize the role that the sanction process can play in assisting future participation in work activities for families that have difficulty complying. These strategies for a compliance-oriented approach to sanctions include the following steps.

• Before any noncompliance occurs, using effective, comprehensive assessments to develop appropriate personal responsibility requirements while identifying and addressing barriers to participation;

• After noncompliance but before a sanction is imposed, working with noncompliant families to review their circumstances, facilitate compliance and avoid unnecessary sanctions; and

• After a sanction is imposed, continuing to work with families in sanction status to assist and encourage compliance and reinstating benefits as soon as compliance occurs.

This paper reviews research that has been conducted on the use of sanctions and on their consequences for families, and spells out some of the strategies states and counties have used for assisting more families in complying with TANF requirements and improving family outcomes.

Comparison of Two Sanction Procedures The following examples contrast two approaches to sanction policy. The first example shows how a state sanction policy can adversely affect a family that has significant barriers to compliance. The second example illustrates how some of the policies and programs that will be further described in this paper can benefit families. South Carolina has one of the highest sanction rates in the nation. This particular example, provided by the South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center, involves a single mother who has ongoing physical and mental health problems and a seven-year-old child with severe disabilities. The child requires ongoing medical care and also has had several cardiac-related surgeries. This mother faced a sanction in 1999 when she missed an appointment with her caseworker because she was at the hospital for her child’s surgery. The mother sought to have the sanction removed through the state’s conciliation process. In that process, the state did not recognize that the mother had ongoing problems that would make compliance difficult or that required special services. Instead, the sanction was lifted only under the condition that the mother pledged not to miss any other appointments. Only one month after the initial sanction threat, the mother faced another sanction when she was late for a job training program because the bus she needed to take was an hour late. This time, she did not seek conciliation because she did not fully understand the notice she received. The notice prepared by the caseworker stated that she did not have good cause for missing the training activity. She therefore thought that she did not have the right to seek a good cause exemption. As a result, her entire family was terminated from assistance. A legal services attorney is assisting her as she seeks a fair hearing with the welfare agency to restore her benefits. Mesa County in Colorado, by contrast, employs procedures intended to avoid inappropriate sanctions and to provide services that enable families to comply with program rules. (Welfare programs in Colorado are operated by counties, which have tremendous flexibility over program design.) The sanction rate in Mesa County is very low. The key to this outcome is a pre-sanction review process for all families before the imposition of any sanction. Under this process, any parent who is noncompliant with program rules is referred to a social worker outside of the welfare agency. The social worker is expected to assess the reasons for non-compliance, change the individual’s plan to better reflect his or her needs and barriers, and offer services necessary to address identified barriers. The social worker can, for example, help families find specialized child care for children with disabilities and help with the purchase of a car for families with transportation problems. In addition, the social worker is expected to assist parents in the conciliation process, which may involve helping parents seek a good cause exemption for an incidence of non-compliance or explaining to parents what they must do to comply with a particular rule and avoid a sanction. This process does not guarantee that families will not be sanctioned, but it does help ensure that families understand program rules and that they have the tools needed to comply. In the three years since implementation of the program, about 68 percent of families referred came into compliance and avoided a sanction. Click here for further discussion of Mesa County’s pre-sanction procedures

Background

The federal law requires all states to sanction families that refuse to comply with work activities without good cause, either by reducing or terminating benefits. Some states also impose sanctions in their TANF programs for failure to comply with other requirements such as ensuring that children are immunized and attending school.⁽²⁾ While work sanctions are required, states have considerable latitude regarding how those sanctions are designed and applied. Benefits may be reduced or completely eliminated. The benefit loss may apply only to the parent's benefit or it may apply to the children's benefits as well. In addition, the benefit reduction or elimination may be temporary or permanent. Most states have adopted sanction policies that are more stringent and more extensive than required by federal law. Thirty-six states impose full-family sanctions for noncompliance with work requirements. In 18 states, the full-family sanction is imposed for the first instance of noncompliance. In the other 18 of the 36 states, a full-family sanction is imposed after a continued period of noncompliance or for repeated instances of noncompliance. In nearly all of these remaining states, an initial instance of noncompliance can escalate into a full-family sanction if the adult remains out of compliance.⁽³⁾

In general, states also impose work-related sanctions for a longer time period than required by federal law. Federal law does not require a state to continue to impose a sanction once the family has come into compliance. Most states, however, impose the sanction for at least a minimum period of time even if the family comes into compliance sooner.⁽⁴⁾

 

Magnitude of State Sanction Use

Analysis of data from states and other sources indicates that under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, states and counties have imposed sanctions that reduced or terminated benefits to several hundred thousand families.   In some states, the number of cases closed due to full-family sanction represents a significant share of case closures.

A recent study from the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that in 1998, an average of 112,700 families each month received reduced TANF benefits due to sanction during each month of calendar year 1998. This meant that 4.5 percent of the families receiving TANF cash assistance were under a partial-benefit sanction.⁽⁵⁾

The GAO study also found that an average of 16,000 families per month lost cash assistance completely nationwide due to full-family sanctions in 1998.⁽⁶⁾ Data on sanctions from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services show substantial differences from the GAO data in many states, although the overall national figure from HHS — an average of 15,000 monthly case closures due to sanction in fiscal year 1998 — is similar to the GAO national figure.⁽⁷⁾

The total number of families without assistance due to full-family sanctions at any given point in time, however, is many times larger than the number of new case closures each month. This is because full-family sanctions usually keep families off assistance beyond the initial month of closure. The GAO found that one-third of families receiving a full-family sanction returned to assistance within a few months, but that the vast majority remained off permanently. This means that in any given month, a certain number of families may newly lose assistance due to sanction, while many other families remain without assistance due to sanctions imposed in prior months. A complete measure of the magnitude of sanctions must consider both groups.⁽⁸⁾

For example, South Carolina reported that an average of 628 families per month newly lost assistance due to sanction in 1998. The South Carolina report also shows that the total number of families that left assistance due to sanction and had not returned averaged 9,500 per month in 1998, or 15 times higher than the number of new monthly case closures.⁽⁹⁾ This reflects the fact that South Carolina implemented its full-family sanctions policy late in 1996, and that the vast majority of families sanctioned each month do not return to assistance.

The methodology employed by South Carolina and some other states in recent "caseload reduction credit" reports submitted to HHS can be used to estimate the cumulative number of families that have been subject to full-family sanctions and remain without benefits nationally. Using reasonable assumptions, it can be estimated that 540,000 families nationwide lost assistance following a full-family sanction sometime from 1997 through 1999. Approximately 370,000 families, or about two-thirds of those receiving a full sanction, are likely to have remained off assistance at the end of 1999.⁽¹⁰⁾

It also is useful to view the number of case closures due to full-family sanction as a share of all case closures. In some states, terminations due to sanction represent a significant share of case closures. For example, state studies of families that have left welfare due to sanction have found that sanctions represented 28 percent of case closures in South Carolina, 20 percent in Arizona, and 31 percent in Kansas over the specific periods of time covered in each study.⁽¹¹⁾ In addition, the administrative data that states collect and report to HHS indicate that sanctions represented roughly one-fifth or more of the case closures in seven states in fiscal year 1999 — Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.

hile sanctions do not represent the majority of reported case closures in any state, they are one of the primary reasons for case closures in a number of states. Moreover, to date, more than three times as many families have lost TANF benefits due to a full-family sanction than due to reaching a time limit.⁽¹²⁾

 

Characteristics of Families That Are Sanctioned

Research indicates that families that are sanctioned have greater barriers to employment than other families receiving welfare. Some or all of these barriers may be the cause of the family being sanctioned since they may affect the ability of the parents to understand and comply with rules or engage in work.

Sanctioned families, when compared to other families receiving welfare, have less education, more limited work experience, and a greater incidence of domestic violence, disabilities and other physical and mental health problems. Sanctioned families also face barriers to employment caused by lack of support services such as child care and transportation. They also are more likely than other families receiving welfare to have more than one of these barriers to employment.

A number of researchers have noted the low education levels of adults in sanctioned families as compared with other welfare recipients, and have associated low education levels with a lack of ability to comply with TANF requirements.⁽¹³⁾

• A recent South Carolina study found that, among all families leaving TANF, those with the lowest educational attainment were twice as likely to be sanctioned, and half as likely to exit due to earned income, as those with the highest education levels. The researchers concluded that this finding "lends support to the theory that sanctioned clients may not be as functionally capable of work as those who leave for other reasons."⁽¹⁴⁾

• Studies from Arizona and Minnesota found that slightly more than half of the families that left TANF due to sanction had an adult with less than a high school education. Of all families leaving TANF in those states, about 40 percent had less than a high school education.⁽¹⁵⁾

• A recent Delaware study similarly found that nearly half of the sanctioned families had not completed high school; the typical sanctioned family had completed 11.2 years of education. The Delaware study noted that sanction rates are higher for those with the least education and that sanctioned individuals were more likely to have trouble understanding TANF rules and the consequences of not participating.⁽¹⁶⁾

Aside from education and skill levels, past work experience often is a crucial factor in obtaining employment. Sanctioned recipients tend to have less prior work experience than other recipients. In Maryland, 41 percent of sanctioned families had no history of prior earnings compared with approximately 31 percent of families that left welfare for other reasons.⁽¹⁷⁾

State studies that have looked at characteristics of sanctioned families also have found a high prevalence of health-related barriers to employment.⁽¹⁸⁾

• A Utah study found that health or medical problems were the most common barriers to employment among sanctioned families. For over a third of the families in the study, a physical health problem was the reason for nonparticipation. One-fifth of the families identified a mental health problem as a reason for nonparticipation.⁽¹⁹⁾

• A Minnesota study found sanctioned families were four times as likely as the caseload as a whole to report chemical dependency, three times as likely to report a family health problem, and twice as likely to report a mental health problem or domestic violence.⁽²⁰⁾

• Data from Connecticut's safety net program, which serves families not eligible for TANF cash assistance because they have exhausted the maximum 21 months of cash benefits that Connecticut provides to families and cannot receive an extension because of sanctions, provide a further indication that sanctioned families are among the most vulnerable. As compared to the general population receiving welfare benefits in Connecticut, families in the safety net program had a significantly higher incidence of substance abuse, health or mental health problems, and domestic violence.⁽²¹⁾

• A study in Iowa surveyed families that had received a second sanction for noncompliance, which terminated their cash benefit. It found that health concerns were a contributing factor to their noncompliance with program rules. One-fifth of adults cited their own health as the contributing factor, and one-eighth responded that a family member's health problem presented a challenge to compliance.⁽²²⁾

In addition, many parents experience a wide range of other barriers that make compliance with work activities a challenge. Various studies have found that noncompliance with work activities is frequently a result of a lack of fundamental supports such as child care and transportation. In the Utah study, 55 percent of sanctioned families cited transportation as a barrier to employment, and almost a quarter of respondents said lack of transportation was the primary reason they were unable to comply. Lack of child care also was a common barrier to compliance for sanctioned families. In the Iowa study, transportation and child care were the most common obstacles for sanctioned families. Almost half of the families in the study said that transportation problems contributed to their noncompliance and over a third cited lack of child care as a reason.

Sanctioned families are more likely than other families receiving welfare to experience several barriers at once, making compliance even more challenging.⁽²³⁾ In Minnesota, 76 percent of sanctioned families had at least one barrier, compared to 35 percent of the total welfare population. Moreover, 39 percent of sanctioned recipients had multiple barriers, compared with only 16 percent of the total population. In the Utah study, 72 percent of sanctioned families had three or more barriers to employment. Those having multiple barriers were most likely to report having health problems, lack of transportation, and mental health problems as reasons for being unable to comply with program requirements.

 

Employment Rates and Earnings of Families That Are Sanctioned

Families that leave welfare due to a full-family sanction fare less well than other families leaving welfare. Sanctioned families are less likely to be employed and, if employed, have lower earnings than families that leave welfare for other reasons. In three recent state studies of families leaving TANF, researchers in Arizona, Maryland and South Carolina each specifically compared the employment rates and the earnings levels of families that left TANF due to sanction with those of other families in the same state that left TANF for reasons other than sanction.⁽²⁴⁾ In all three states, families that left TANF due to sanction were significantly less likely to be employed in the quarter after leaving TANF than families that left TANF for other reasons. See Table 1. For example, 31 percent of the families that left TANF due to sanction in South Carolina were employed after leaving TANF as compared to 58 percent of the families that left TANF for other reasons.

Table 1

Employment Rates of Sanctioned Leavers Compared to Non-sanctioned Leavers: First Quarter After Welfare Exit
	Sanctioned Families	Non-sanctioned Leavers
Arizona	40%	55%
Maryland	38%	56%
South Carolina	31%	58%

When families leaving welfare due to sanction were employed, they had significantly lower earnings than other TANF leavers who were employed. In Maryland and South Carolina, both of which measured median earnings after leaving welfare, the typical employed family that left due to sanction had earnings that were three-fifths the amount of the typical employed family that left TANF due to other reasons. Lower earnings also were found in an Arizona study which looked at average earnings (see Table 2). In addition, in Arizona and South Carolina which conducted follow-up analyses, families that left due to sanctions continued to have lower earnings throughout the study period. The studies followed families after exit for up to an additional year in Arizona and two years in South Carolina.

Table 2

Earnings of Employed Families that Left TANF Due to Sanction as Compared to Those of Employed Families that Left TANF for Other Reasons:  First Quarter After Welfare Exit
	Sanctioned Families	Non-sanctioned Leavers
Arizona	$1,649 (average)	$2,233 (average)
Maryland	$1,648 (average) $1,337 (median)	$2,456 (average) $2,240 (median)
South Carolina	$1,689 (average) $1,064 (median)	$1,835 (average) $1,730 (median)

In sum, it is evident from the research described above that noncompliance often results from a variety of barriers to cooperation, rather than from willful disregard of TANF rules. It also is clear that sanctioned families tend to fare worse in employment and earnings than other families who leave welfare. This evidence suggests that severe penalties imposed quickly on large numbers of families can be counter-productive because the sanction destabilizes the family and reduces the chance that a parent can adequately support the family without welfare.

Some states already have recognized this problem and have begun to use the sanction process as an opportunity to assess and intervene with the most vulnerable families and to improve their outcomes. These states have taken steps to adjust their sanction process. The rest of this paper will examine strategies that states can take to achieve work participation and better outcomes for families that have difficulty complying with work requirements.

 

Before Noncompliance: States Can Reduce a Family's Risk of Sanction by Assessing Barriers to Compliance and Setting Appropriate Participation Requirements

If a state actively helps families with barriers comply with work requirements, it is likely that fewer families will face sanctions for noncompliance. A family will be more likely to comply successfully if the activity required is appropriate for the family's circumstances and any barriers to participation are identified and addressed at the outset.

A key way to match recipients with work activities, and to identify barriers to compliance, is through individualized assessments. The federal welfare law requires states to assess an individual's employability and skills.⁽²⁵⁾ Many states use the assessment process to screen for and identify any obstacles that can affect a family's ability to comply. While it is important that an assessment be conducted at the beginning of a family's time on assistance or the first time TANF requirements are imposed on the family, assessment should be viewed as an ongoing or periodic process rather than a single event. Even if a state generally requires initial job search before an in-depth assessment, the state should incorporate an initial screening to identify families for whom an in-depth assessment should be conducted prior to any work requirement being imposed.

States can utilize the assessment process to effectively promote a compliance-oriented approach.

• An in-depth assessment conducted prior to requiring participation in work activities can prevent sanctions for noncompliance with inappropriate work requirements. A thorough assessment can help determine which activities are most appropriate for a family, or whether the parent requires additional supports or services to facilitate participation. Currently, a number of states conduct an assessment only after a parent has not found employment through an initial period of job search. Thus a family might be sanctioned in those states for not complying with the job search requirement before the state has assessed what a plan for this family should include or addressed any barriers to compliance.

• An in-depth assessment can help determine the ideal sequence of work activities based upon each individual family's circumstances. Each family may require a different sequence of activities that will best ensure ongoing compliance. A number of states always require a period of job search — typically for four weeks but in some states for eight or 12 weeks — before the recipient can be assigned to any other activity, even before an assessment takes place. This may be an appropriate course for some families. However, a parent who may require substance abuse treatment to obtain and retain employment may not succeed at following the TANF job search requirements and could end up sanctioned before any services or referrals to more appropriate activities are provided. Similar consequences are likely for many other parents with barriers to employment.

Assessment alone, of course, is not sufficient. To reduce the risk of noncompliance, caseworkers should have the flexibility to set work participation requirements that reflect the needs and barriers that the assessment finds. Initially, many states were reluctant to do that and instead implemented aggressive "work first" approaches in their TANF programs. A number of states designed their TANF programs to maximize participation that would count towards the federally required work rate. A more flexible approach is possible now because, as described below, all states are easily meeting federal work participation requirements.

• Allowing a wide range of activities to meet the state's participation requirement can encourage compliance by permitting families to utilize the supports and activities the assessment suggests are necessary. State TANF programs should be flexible enough to meet needs that are identified by an assessment. This includes activities such as substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling, adult basic education, supported work programs, and specialized training programs.

• Flexibility in a state's hourly participation requirements can be necessary to prevent sanctions from being imposed on certain vulnerable families. The majority of states require all single parents to participate in work activities for at least 30 hours per week regardless of the circumstances of the family. A family's individual circumstances, however, may dictate that the parent is only available for work for limited periods or while a child is in school. For example, a parent of a child with severe disabilities may need to be home when the child returns from school. In some cases, a parent's disability may require that the parent work fewer hours.

Because of dramatic caseload reductions, states are easily meeting the work participation rate that applies to all families and have greater flexibility than anticipated to adjust their requirements to better serve families with barriers to compliance. All states met their effective work participation requirements for 1999, due in part to a federal statutory provision called the "caseload reduction credit" which reduces the required work participation rates based on the state's past caseload decline since 1995.⁽²⁶⁾ Some states have used this flexibility to adjust the initial design of their TANF programs and modify the work requirements for families with barriers to employment, particularly for individuals with disabilities or health-related barriers.

• New Mexico recently modified its work participation requirements for individuals whose disability requires reasonable modifications in work activities but is not so severe as to qualify for a total exemption from work participation under the state's TANF rules. The new policy requires an assessment and a modified work plan for such individuals, with greater flexibility about the types of activities and number of hours of participation required. Generally, a nonexempt individual with a disability will still be required to participate in work-related activities for 30 hours a week, but 10 hours of this requirement can be met with specialized training or with therapeutic activities. Some individuals may instead receive a temporary exemption from the work requirement. In these cases, the service provider works with the individual to develop a specialized plan to address the identified limitations. While the state can count alternative activities outlined in the specialized plan toward the state's work requirement, they may not all necessarily be counted toward the federal participation rate under TANF. However, as explained above, this is unlikely to pose a problem because of substantial caseload reduction credits in most states.

• Tennessee has recently implemented the Family Services Counseling program (FSC) which can result in a modified work plan for a family. Families that are not immediately ready to work have an option to enter a more intensive program through which masters-level social workers from local counseling agencies conduct or secure assessments and provide intensive case management and referrals. FSC counselors also can redesign individual responsibility plans to include alternative or reduced work requirements. They can suspend both work requirements and time limits entirely if necessary. The program is considered a work activity for the purposes of the state's work requirements. It is designed to address barriers such as mental health, domestic violence, substance abuse, learning disabilities, and children's health and behavior problems. Welfare caseworkers are required to inform families of the program whenever they come in to apply or be re-certified (about every three to six months). Families can choose to participate, without being required to disclose the details of their personal circumstances to their caseworkers. Caseworkers also are required to refer to the program families that are at risk of being sanctioned, experiencing any of the barriers listed, identified by another agency as a referral to the FSC program, or individuals who are currently in a substance abuse or domestic violence program.

 

After Noncompliance but Before a Sanction Is Imposed: States Can Review the Circumstances of Noncompliant Families and Help Them Comply

An individual's noncompliance with a TANF work requirement may provide a state with a signal that the family does not understand what is required of them, or that it faces barriers to compliance that had not been identified previously. This may be particularly true if a state has not conducted assessments with sufficient depth or frequency to identify such barriers at the outset. In the context of a family about to be sanctioned, noncompliance can serve as an indicator of barriers and as an additional alert to the state to provide more intensive services to the family. A pre-sanction review should not be viewed as a substitute for an up-front and in-depth assessment. Such a review can serve, however, as an important second opportunity to identify family needs and barriers and to adjust the required Individual Responsibility Plan if needed. Addressing a family's barriers to compliance before a sanction is imposed will make it more feasible for the parent to come into compliance. Once a sanction has been imposed — particularly a full-family sanction — the family faces a deeper crisis to meet basic needs which can make compliance even more difficult.

A Compliance-oriented Approach to Sanctions and the Americans with Disabilities Act State TANF programs must comply with requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA requires a state to make reasonable modifications to program policies and procedures that deny a person with a disability access to benefits under the program if the modification would not fundamentally alter the program. Imposing a sanction that denies or reduces TANF benefits to a person with a disability for failure to comply with work requirements could violate the ADA if the individual’s disability prevents compliance but the person could meet participation requirements with reasonable modification. For example, if a parent has a disability that precludes full-time employment but the parent could work 25 hours per week, sanctioning the family for failure to comply with the state’s TANF policy requiring 40 hours per week of work activities would violate the ADA. As states conduct assessments of TANF recipients, any employability plan that is developed should include the accommodations required by the individual’s disability. In the majority of states, certain individuals with a disability or who are caring for a household member who is disabled are not required to participate in TANF work activities and thus are not likely to be sanctioned. In these states, however, some individuals with disabilities who qualify for protection under the ADA may not meet the state’s standard for a work exemption, which may require very severe or prolonged disability. For example, New Mexico exempts individuals from participation in work activities only if they have a total disability which prevents any gainful employment. In addition, some individuals who qualify for a disability exemption may wish to volunteer to participate in work activities but require some accommodation. Under the ADA, a state should assist such voluntary participation in work activities, including making reasonable modifications that will enable participation. Thus, a state that generally exempts persons with disabilities from work requirements will still need to ensure that it does not improperly sanction individuals with disabilities. States that do not exempt individuals with disabilities from work requirements likewise need to ensure that they do not improperly sanction an individual with a disability who is unable to comply with a work requirement but could comply with a modified requirement. In response to ADA concerns, both New Mexico and Tennessee have recently implemented changes to their TANF programs to allow individuals with disabilities to meet their TANF work requirements through modified work plans. See discussion of New Mexico and Tennessee initiatives at pages 14 and 15. For a general discussion of the applicability of the ADA to TANF programs, see "Guidance on Civil Rights Laws and Welfare Reform," HHS Office for Civil Rights, August, 1999.

A pre-sanction review provides the state a second opportunity to evaluate the circumstances of a noncompliant family and to assist the family to participate successfully in work activities.

• A pre-sanction review can provide a second look at whether there is good cause for noncompliance or if the family should be exempt from work requirements. Individuals may be noncompliant as a result of temporary or permanent barriers that prevent participation in certain TANF activities. All states have established some good cause criteria for noncompliance that, when identified, can prevent a sanction from being imposed wrongfully.⁽²⁷⁾ Moreover, federal law prohibits a state from imposing a sanction on a single parent of a child under age six if child care is not available. See box. In addition, the majority of states exempt families from work participation in certain situations, most commonly if the adult is disabled or caring for a family member who is disabled. Families that should be exempt under the state's exemption criteria, however, could face sanctions if the basis for an exemption was not identified in the assessment process or developed after the initial assessment was completed.

• A pre-sanction review provides another opportunity to identify and address any barriers to compliance, and to determine if the required activity should be modified for the family. Families that are not exempt from work requirements may require more supports, or alternative activities, that can help them work. See ADA box. For example, transportation problems that may not have been anticipated at the initial assessment may be the cause of an individual's noncompliance. While an individual may demonstrate good cause for missing an appointment because of a transportation problem — and therefore a sanction is not imposed — the next step is to address the problem so that the individual can comply in the future. A compliance-oriented approach to sanctions, therefore, goes beyond avoiding inappropriate sanctions and also assists compliance.

• A pre-sanction review also can provide a second chance for compliance by ensuring that the individual understands what actions he or she is required to take. As noted by researchers in Delaware, particularly in light of the higher sanction rates among recipients with less education, many recipients who are sanctioned may not understand the program requirements.⁽²⁸⁾ In an Iowa study, over one-quarter of the parents who lost cash assistance due to sanction cited their lack of understanding about program rules.⁽²⁹⁾

• A pre-sanction review can be utilized to secure additional supports and training that can make it possible for the parent to move into stable employment. For example, suppose a parent was sanctioned for losing a fast-food cashier job because of a previously unidentified learning disability. A pre-sanction review could allow a caseworker to assess the problem and connect the parent to a specialized training program leading to a more stable job that is better matched to the parent's needs and abilities.

States May Not Impose Sanctions on a Single Parent of a Child Under Age Six if Child Care Is Not Available Under the federal welfare law states may not reduce or terminate assistance to a single parent caring for a child under age six if the parent demonstrates an inability to obtain needed child care for one or more of the following reasons: Appropriate child care is not available within a reasonable distance from home or work; Informal child care by a relative or under other arrangements is unavailable or unsuitable; or Appropriate and affordable formal child care is unavailable. While the parent must demonstrate that child care is not available, the state must set forth criteria for such a determination and define the relevant terms. In addition, the state must inform parents of this exception — that they cannot be sanctioned for failure to participate in work if child care is unavailable — and of the process for obtaining a determination based on this exception. Thus, under the TANF federal rules, every sanction notice should include this information. States should review the notices they provide to be sure they comply with the final rules. To the extent that the state has other good cause reasons under which a sanction will not be imposed, as every state has, sanction notices should also contain information about other circumstances under which a sanction will not be imposed. It is also important that notices inform parents that under the ADA, if they have a disability, modifications to requirements can be made to accommodate them. States are subject to penalties if they improperly impose sanctions on a single parent of a child under age six who cannot obtain needed child care. The final TANF rules, published April 12, 1999, also address the factors HHS will consider in determining whether to impose the maximum penalty, or a reduced penalty if a state violates this prohibition. The rules provide that the maximum penalty will be imposed if there is a pattern of substantiated complaints or if there is no statewide process in place to inform parents about this exception and enable them to demonstrate an inability to obtain child care. Conversely, HHS may reduce the penalty if such violations were isolated or affected a minimal number of families. See 42 USC § 607(e)(2); 45 CFR § 261.15, §§ 261.56-7.

There are a number of ways a state can design pre-sanction reviews. Many states have retained a "conciliation" process from the former JOBS program. Conciliation is an attempt to resolve a sanction prior to imposing it and could be a vehicle for the types of efforts discussed below. About 20 states have eliminated conciliation but have some alternate process. In many cases, however, neither the conciliation nor the alternate process are used as effectively as they could be to assist in a compliance-oriented approach to sanctions.

Three approaches to pre-sanction reviews currently used in states or counties are discussed below. In each of these models, the sanction is not imposed if the pre-sanction review process results in compliance or a determination that the sanction or the work requirement is not appropriate.

• Under Tennessee's Customer Service Review process, all families whose assistance is scheduled to be terminated due to noncompliance (as well as cases to be closed for other reasons) are given a second look and a second chance for compliance.⁽³⁰⁾ Reviewers who are not a part of the local welfare agency meet with the family to gauge whether or not the caseworker's noncompliance determination is appropriate. They look at whether the family should have been exempt from work requirements or if there is good cause for noncompliance. Families are then given a second chance whereby if they agree to comply, and then do comply for two weeks, they will not be sanctioned.⁽³¹⁾

During 1999, about a third of the families that were slated to receive full-family sanctions ultimately did not receive them as a result of Customer Service Reviews. In 70 percent of these cases, the parents came into compliance. In the remaining 30 percent, the reviewers found errors in caseworkers' application of the sanction policies. Since the program was implemented in 1998, there also has been a reduction in the number of initial determinations to impose a sanction.

• Mesa County, Colorado also has a pre-sanction review process. Prior to sanctioning a family that has failed to participate in required work activities, a case manager must refer the case to an Intervention Program social worker. For a three-month period, the social worker meets with the family as many times as necessary, including home visits, to provide services including assessing the family's needs, identifying barriers, and providing intensive services to address the barriers. The social worker also has the authority to redesign the Individual Service Plan to include activities that are more appropriate for the family given the barriers they are facing, such as basic education or counseling. If the individual complies with the new plan within 90 days (or longer at the social worker's request), the sanction will not be imposed. At the end of the 90-day period, another meeting is held with a review team consisting of the social worker, the social worker's supervisor and the individual. The individual is given a final chance to comply at this time. In the three years since implementation of the program, about 68 percent of families referred came into compliance and avoided a sanction.

• In Philadelphia, the TANF Compliance Program provides intensive services to noncompliant families facing sanction with the goal of helping them understand the sanction process, and assisting them to come into compliance.⁽³²⁾ Teams of service providers conduct home visits with families in which they explain the sanction process and the steps required for compliance, explain the resources available to assist TANF recipients find a job or work activity, and provide referrals to outside social services and child care resources. In addition, the team, which is composed of employees of a non-profit social service agency, accompanies the family to appointments at the welfare agency to ensure that the process runs smoothly and the family understands all of the TANF rules. This has been especially useful for families that do not speak English as a first language. Counselors in the program make follow-up calls to families on an ongoing basis until the family has come into compliance.

Philadelphia's TANF Compliance Program already has seen positive results since its inception. Between June 1999 and February 2000, 82 percent of the families referred to the program are no longer at risk of sanction.⁽³³⁾

Obtaining Compliance to Avoid Imposing a TANF Sanction Also Helps  Families Avoid Sanctions Affecting Medicaid, Food Stamp and Housing Benefits Sanctions in TANF programs can result in loss of benefits in other needs-based programs on which many TANF recipients rely to meet basic needs. The compounding of the TANF sanction penalties by reducing, and in some circumstances, terminating these other benefits can further disrupt the family and impede the adult’s capacity to comply with the original TANF work requirement. Some of the policies that carry TANF sanctions over to other programs are required under federal law while others are state options. Medicaid: States have the option — which 13 states have chosen — to terminate Medicaid coverage of non-pregnant adults who lose TANF due to refusal to comply with TANF work rules. States cannot terminate the Medicaid of children or pregnant women based on an adult’s noncompliance with TANF work activities. (State-specific information about this option is available through the State Policy Documentation Project, ). Food stamps: Unlike TANF sanctions, full-family sanctions cannot last beyond six months in the food stamp program. Under some circumstances, depending on the options a state has selected, food stamps may continue to families under sanction in TANF. A broader range of people are exempted from food stamp work requirements than from TANF work requirements; the largest exempted group are parents with children under age six. For individuals who receive sanctions for noncompliance with TANF work rules, and who are not exempt from food stamp work requirements, a state must terminate the individual’s food stamps and may disqualify the whole household from food stamps; 19 states have opted to terminate the entire household. If an individual receives a sanction for noncompliance with TANF conduct requirements (for example, failure to immunize a child), states have a separate option to disqualify the individual (but not the entire household) from food stamps; 16 states have chosen this option. In general, a family cannot receive an increase in food stamps based on the loss of income due to a TANF behavioral sanction. A state also may reduce food stamps up to 25 percent as a means of, or in addition to, ensuring that there is no food stamp increase due to the loss of TANF income resulting from a sanction. Food stamp sanctions may last longer or less long than a TANF sanction for the same instance of noncompliance. Federal public housing and Section 8 certificates and vouchers: A family that experiences a loss of income due to a TANF work-related sanction cannot qualify for a reduction in rent that otherwise would be available to adjust for the loss of family income. Thus, for example, a family that loses TANF due to a full-family sanction and cannot pay a rental amount that was based on the TANF income may be evicted and lose access to the ongoing housing subsidy. (This "sanction rent" policy does not apply to project-based Section 8 tenants.) As part of a compliance-oriented approach to sanction, states that have chosen policy options extending TANF sanctions by carrying them over to other public benefit programs may want to revisit these choices. Compounding penalties will only make it more difficult for families to comply or, whether or not they return to TANF, to meet their families’ needs. Moreover, carrying-over of sanctions to the benefits received from other programs is triggered when the TANF sanction is imposed. By making efforts to obtain compliance before any sanction is imposed, states can promote a family’s successful compliance by avoiding the family disruption caused both by the loss of cash assistance and by any resulting loss or reduction of Medicaid, food stamps or a housing subsidy.

Using pre-sanction reviews to avert a sanction can be critical to families that could suffer a deeper crisis as a result of a sanction. Once a sanction has been imposed, the parent may need to spend time seeking food or other emergency help, trying to stop eviction or utility shut-off, or otherwise trying to survive without income. The parent is less likely to have time, or resources, to participate in work activities. Moreover, sanctions that are imposed in a state's TANF program can and, in some cases, must result in additional sanctions in other benefit programs, specifically Medicaid, food stamps and certain housing assistance. See further discussion in box. The loss of TANF income as well as the carrying over of a TANF sanction to other benefits thus can further deepen a family crisis and impair a parent's capacity to comply.

 

After a Sanction Is Imposed: Continue To Work with Sanctioned Families To Help Them Come Into Compliance and Avoid Future Sanctions, and Reinstate Benefits As Soon As Compliance Occurs

When a sanction has been imposed, a state should not abandon a family that is in sanction status. Even if benefits have been terminated, states should consider continuing to follow-up with families and provide services to help them come into compliance. As with pre-sanction reviews, post-sanction compliance efforts provide an opportunity to explain how to come into compliance and cure the sanction, and to identify and address any barriers to compliance.⁽³⁴⁾ In addition, a family that has been sanctioned may need additional crisis prevention or intervention because of the loss of income due to sanction.

Post-sanction Follow-up and Services

There are several reasons why it is important to continue follow-up services with families that have been sanctioned:

• To assist the family to come into compliance after a sanction, and to maintain compliance. Whatever barriers prevented compliance prior to the sanction being imposed are likely to continue to prevent compliance after a sanction. For example, if a parent has no transportation to the required work activity, compliance is unlikely until the transportation problem is addressed. Moreover, if the problem that prevented an individual from complying persists, even after the initial sanction is cured, noncompliance could recur. If the parent without transportation borrowed a car temporarily as a special favor to come into compliance and alleviate the crisis of the sanction, ongoing compliance will require a stable transportation solution.

• To prevent escalation of sanctions to more severe penalties, as can occur in many states. In about half the states, the penalty for an initial instance of noncompliance escalates if the family does not come into compliance within a specified time. In most of these states, a partial sanction escalates into a full-family sanction. Often the minimum duration of the sanction escalates as well, and in some cases the sanction becomes permanent. Families with barriers that are not addressed may not be able to comply before the sanction escalates. An increased sanction is likely to exacerbate the family's problems and make compliance more difficult.

• To ensure the welfare agency does not lose contact with sanctioned families altogether, missing an opportunity to assist them to participate in work activities. This is especially significant in states with full-family sanctions. Some state studies indicate that two-thirds of families that lose TANF benefits due to full-family sanctions do not return to welfare.⁽³⁵⁾ Families that have no other means of support are at risk of serious hardships if they do not understand how to come into compliance and have their benefits restored. Sanction notices often are difficult to understand, especially for families with limited English proficiency, low education or literacy levels, low intelligence, or learning disabilities. They may not know that they still are eligible to receive benefits after the sanction ends and they may feel alienated from the welfare office and not want to return. A post-sanction home visit can help the family to understand the compliance process, maintain the agency's connection with the family, and identify other steps needed — services and supports — that will enable the parent to successfully work or move toward employment.

For these reasons, it is important to continue to work with sanctioned families to help them understand the process, come into compliance, and obtain the services they need. This can be accomplished through follow-up phone calls, home visits, and referrals to outside services. Follow-up services should include an explanation of why the sanction was imposed and how the family can come back into compliance, address any barriers to compliance and establish a plan to help the family maintain compliance after the sanction is lifted. It also is important to assist the family in meeting basic needs. This may include referral to emergency services or directly providing services including vouchers for certain needs such as rent and transportation costs. Follow-up services also can ensure that a sanctioned family has not improperly lost access to Medicaid and food stamps.⁽³⁶⁾

Some states and counties have taken steps to provide follow-up services after a sanction has been imposed.

• In El Paso County, Colorado, a Sanction Prevention team — consisting of a TANF supervisor, caseworker, a vocational rehabilitation worker, and others as needed — meets with sanctioned individuals to review their Individual Responsibility Contracts (IRC), and develop a plan for curing the sanction.⁽³⁷⁾ At this point, the IRC may be rewritten. The family's barriers to compliance are addressed through referrals to various support services, such as child care and medical services, and counseling. If the individual cannot be reached by phone, up to two home visits are made. The team will continue to work with the family for as long as necessary to help it cure the sanction. Once the client comes into compliance, the sanction is lifted. The results from the program have been positive. For the period between August 1999 and June 1999, half of the families that were referred to the program cured the sanction. Many of the remaining families did not wish to receive services from the Sanction Prevention Program, although some could not be reached by the Sanction Prevention team.

• A program in Cuyahoga County, Ohio provides similar post-sanction services.⁽³⁸⁾ The county's Safety Net program seeks to ensure the well-being of families that have been sanctioned and to re-engage parents with work activities by connecting families to an extensive network of service providers, including both government and non-profit agencies throughout the community.⁽³⁹⁾ The program is run through a contract between Cuyahoga County and two social service agencies using TANF funds.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Staff from the two outside agencies contact families that have been sanctioned through phone calls and home visits. Once contact has been made, the home visitors continue to work with the family for as long as necessary while also maintaining contact with the family's case manager at the welfare agency to assist with the process of curing the sanction and to serve as a liaison if problems arise. The purposes of the home visits are to:

Explain the sanction process and how the family can come into compliance.

Conduct an assessment of the family and identify why they did not comply and any barriers which may have prevented compliance.

Connect the family with a range of services in the community, including housing agencies, utility companies, the police department, counseling services, food pantries, schools, and early childhood programs to address any needs or risks that arise from losing income.

During the first 10 months of implementation (August 1999 through June 2000), 46 percent of sanctioned families that were referred to the Safety Net program were assessed and provided with information and services. Almost all of these families (42 percent of all referrals) were able to participate in work activities and have their cases re-opened as a result of the program. The remaining families either no longer needed services from the program, or did not wish to receive them. Many were able to return to assistance on their own, either through curing the sanction or by having good cause for noncompliance.⁽⁴¹⁾

 

Ensure That Families Know How to Cure a Sanction and Then Restore Benefits as Soon They Comply

Once a sanction has been imposed, it is important that a family knows how to cure the sanction or come into compliance, and that their benefits be restored at the time they comply. If a family that has lost benefits does not know how to come into compliance, it may never regain eligibility. Information on how to come into compliance should be provided orally by caseworkers and in written notices from the agency. The HHS Office of Inspector General reports that only one-third of the sanction notices they reviewed explicitly provide information on how to come into compliance.⁽⁴²⁾

Many states do restore benefits upon (or shortly after) compliance, particularly at the first instance of noncompliance with work requirements. But more than half of the states impose at least a minimum of one month of sanction at the first instance of noncompliance and at least six states impose minimum periods that are longer than one month. Most states impose longer minimum sanction periods for subsequent or continuing instances of noncompliance. In nearly half the states, the most stringent sanction for noncompliance with work requirements is imposed for a minimum of six months. This includes seven states that impose lifetime full-family sanctions.

While information on how to "cure" a sanction always should be included in the original sanction notice, it would help families if the information also were provided when any minimum sanction period has lapsed. For example, Pennsylvania recently has adopted a procedure in which an "end of sanction" letter is sent when the minimum sanction period has expired. The letter invites families to contact the caseworker or supervisor to find out what they need to do to return to assistance.⁽⁴³⁾

In addition, a compliance-oriented model should restore benefits as soon as the family comes into compliance. Depending on the circumstances, such an approach might require more than a promise to participate in work and require some demonstrated act of compliance or a brief period (for example, two weeks) of demonstrated compliance. To impose a mandatory minimum period of disqualification, however, does not encourage or further compliance and primarily serves a punitive purpose. Moreover, a severe and prolonged sanction — such as total loss of benefits — can create a serious disruption in the family's life. Under these circumstances, attempting to comply with TANF requirements becomes even more challenging for the family. For example, a family may experience eviction or need to seek emergency help because of reduction or loss of cash welfare benefits, reducing the adult's capacity to spend time complying with work activities.

 

Conclusion

Consistent with their desire to move all families to work, some states have adopted procedures which assist families that would otherwise face sanction to comply with required work activities. The benefits to families can be enormous. Through the process of assisting families to come into compliance, states and counties often learn more about the particular family's needs and the barriers they need to overcome in order to secure and retain employment. In some cases, modifications to individual contracts can be made that reflect better the person's limitations and pace. When families ultimately leave welfare, the chances are greater that they will be earning a better salary. Incorporating strong pre-sanction and post-sanction procedures is good public policy, supports states' welfare reform goals, and will ensure that more families are better able to successfully leave cash assistance, and work and support their families.

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Appendix A: Summary of State Sanction Policies

State	First Sanction		Maximum Sanction		Can first instance escalate to maximum sanction for any families?1
	Reduction Amount	Duration	Reduction Amount	Duration
Totals	33 Partial sanction only 15 Termination only 3 Both (policy differs by subgroup)2		15 Partial sanction only 34 Termination only 2 Both (policy differs by subgroup)		Yes: 23 No: 24 N/A: 4
Alabama	25%	Until compliance	Termination	6 months	Y
Alaska	Adult's needs (about $369)	Until compliance	Adult's needs (about $369)	12 months	N
Arizona	25%	1 month	Termination	Until compliance	Y
Arkansas	25%	Until compliance	25%	Until compliance	N/A
California	Adult's portion	Until compliance	Adult's portion	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Colorado	25%	1 to 3 months3	Termination	3 to 6 months	Y
Connecticut	20%	3 months	Termination	3 months	Y
Delaware	One-third	Until compliance	Termination	Permanent	Y
District of Columbia	Adult's portion	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Adult's portion	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Florida	Termination	Until compliance for 10 days	Termination	3 months followed by compliance for 30 days	N
Georgia	25%	Until compliance	Termination	Permanent	Y
Hawaii	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	3 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Idaho	Termination	1 months or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	Permanent	N
Illinois	50%	Until compliance	Termination	3 months or compliance, whichever is longer	Y
Indiana	Adult's portion	2 months or compliance, whichever is longer4	Adult's portion	36 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Iowa	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Kansas	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	2 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Kentucky  (group 1)5	Pro rata reduction of percentage of noncompliant individual	Until compliance	Pro rata reduction of percentage of noncompliant individual	Until compliance	N/A
Kentucky  (group 2)	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance	N/A
Louisiana	Adult portion	3 months	Termination	1 month	Y
Maine	Adult portion	Until compliance	Adult portion	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Maryland	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance for 30 days	N
Massachusetts	Adult portion	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance	Y
Michigan  (group 1)6	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance	N/A
Michigan  (group 2)	25%	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Y
Minnesota	10% of transitional standard7	1 month	30% of transitional standard after rent and utilities are vendor-paid	6 months	Y
Mississippi	Termination	2 months or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	Permanent	N
Missouri	25%	Until compliance	25%	3 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Montana	Adult portion	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Adult portion8	12 months or compliance	Y
Nebraska	Termination	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	12 months or compliance, whichever is longer9	N
Nevada	One-third or pro-rata reduction of noncompliant individual's share, whichever is greater	Until compliance	Termination	Permanent	N10
New Hampshire	Adult portion	1 payment period (at least ½ month)	2/3 reduction after deduction of the adult's portion	1 payment period (at least ½ month	Y
New Jersey	Adult portion	1 month or compliance or termination	Termination	3 months11	Y
New Mexico	25%	Until compliance	Termination	6 months	Y
New York	Pro-rata reduction	Until compliance	Pro-rata reduction	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
North Carolina12	25%	3 months	Termination	1 month and subsequent compliance for 1 month	Y
North Dakota	Adult portion	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	12 months	N13
Ohio	Termination	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Oklahoma	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance, after 2 weeks of compliance (at worker discretion)	N
Oregon	$50	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance	Y
Pennsylvania (group 1)14	Adult portion	30 days or compliance, whichever is longer	Adult portion	Permanent	N
Pennsylvania (group 2)	Termination	30 days or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	Permanent	N
Rhode Island (group 1)15	Adult portion	Until compliance	Adult portion	Until compliance	N/A
Rhode Island (group 2)	110% of adult portion	Until compliance	140% of adult portion	Until compliance	Y
South Carolina	Termination	Until compliance for 30 days	Termination	Until compliance for 30 days	N/A
South Dakota	50%	1 month	Termination	1 month	Y
Tennessee	Termination	Until compliance	Termination	3 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Texas	Noncompliant individual's portion16	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Noncompliant individual's portion	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Utah	$100	Until compliance	Termination	Until compliance	Y
Vermont	Adult portion	Until compliance	Adult portion	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Virginia	Termination	1 month or compliance, whichever is longer	Termination	6 months or compliance, whichever is longer	N
Washington	Adult portion	Until compliance	40%	Until compliance	Y
West Virginia	one-third	3 months	Termination	6 months	Y17
Wisconsin	Pay-for-performance sanction policy - per hour reduction 18		Termination	Permanent	Y
Wyoming	Termination	1 month and subsequent compliance for 1 month	Termination	1 month and subsequent compliance for 1 month	N/A
Note: Data for Appendices A and B come from the State Policy Documentation Project (SPDP), a joint project of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Center for Law and Social Policy. 1. In many states, sanctions escalate after further instances of noncompliance or continued noncompliance, or, in many cases, both. In these states the amount and/or the duration of the sanction can increase. This column describes whether or not individuals can receive the maximum sanction amount and duration for continued noncompliance after an initial sanction. "N/A" refers to states in which each sanction imposed is identical, so there is no maximum sanction. 2. In four states, sanctions differ for different subgroups. This can be either a difference in the amount of the grant reduction, or one group may be terminated while the other receives a partial sanction. This is explained in greater detail in the notes below. 3. In Colorado, counties determine the duration of sanctions within the given time frame. 4. In Indiana, minors and recipients who are not mandated to participate but volunteer for the program have a shorter sanction duration (until compliance for the first sanction and 6 months for the maximum sanction). 5. In Kentucky, families in which the participant does not complete an assessment (group 2) are subject to a more strict sanction than recipients who do not comply with other program requirements (group 1). 6. In Michigan, those who do not comply within the first two months of receiving assistance (group 1) are subject to a more strict sanction than those who have received assistance for longer than two months (group 2). 7. In Minnesota, the "transitional standard" is equivalent to the total cash plus MFIP food portion of the grant. 8. In Montana, the sanctioned individual must renegotiate their Family Investment Agreement (FIA) in order to begin receiving the full grant after the sanction period ends. If this does not occur, the case is closed and the entire family is terminated from assistance. The state considers this an eligibility requirement, rather than another level of sanctioning. 9. In Nebraska, the maximum sanction duration may be shorter than 12 months if the family reaches the state's 48-month time limit before the 12 month sanction period ends. 10. In Nevada, families can be terminated from assistance if they continue to be in noncompliance after the first sanction. However, they will not be permanently terminated from assistance (the maximum sanction duration) unless they continue to be in noncompliance after third sanction. 11. In New Jersey, if noncompliance continues beyond 3 months during the maximum sanction period, the case is formally terminated. 12. For subsequent sanctions after the first sanction, families in North Carolina are under a "pay-after-performance" system lasting three months in which individuals must be in full compliance for the whole month before receiving any benefits the following month. Note: North Carolina changed its sanction policy as of April 1, 2000. Under the former policy, recipients received partial sanctions for noncompliance beginning with a $50 reduction for a first instance of noncompliance and escalating to a maximum of a $75 grant reduction. 13. In North Dakota, families can be terminated from assistance for 3 months for continued noncompliance within the first sanction. However, the 12-month termination occurs after the 4th instance of noncompliance only if the noncompliance continues past the initial 3-month termination period. 14. In Pennsylvania, families that have received assistance for more than 24 months (group 2) are subject to a more strict sanction than those on assistance for less than 24 months (group 1). 15. In Rhode Island, families who are within their first 24 months of an employment plan (group 1) are subject to a different sanction than families who have had an employment plan for at least 25 months (group 2). 16. In Texas, the noncompliant individual's portion is equal to $78 if one parent does not comply and $125 if two parents do not comply. 17. In West Virginia, 3 instances of noncompliance lead to a maximum grant reduction sanction (as opposed to continued noncompliance), however, all 3 instances can occur within the time frame of the first sanction. 18. In Wisconsin's "Pay-for-Performance" system, participants receive an hour for hour grant reduction based on the number of hours they miss of their work activity. Participants who do not participate at all receive a "strike." After three strikes, the individual becomes permanently ineligible to participate in that component of Wisconsin's welfare reform program for life.

 

Appendix B: Timing of Full-Family Sanctions for Noncompliance with Work Activities
(In the 36 states that impose full-family sanctions)

State	First Instance of Noncompliance		Second Instance of Noncompliance		Third Instance of Noncompliance
	Full -family sanction imposed immediately	Period of noncompliance necessary for partial sanction to become full-family sanction	Full -family sanction imposed immediately	Period of noncompliance necessary for partial sanction to become full-family sanction	Full -family sanction imposed immediately	Period of noncompliance necessary for partial sanction to become full-family sanction
Totals*	18	18	22	14	31	6
Alabama		3 months (whether or not consecutive)		3 months (whether or not consecutive)		3 months (whether or not consecutive)
Arizona		2 months1		1 month
Colorado		Time period determined by county1		Time period determined by county
Connecticut		6 months1		3 months
Delaware		4 months1		2 months
Florida
Georgia		3 months
Hawaii